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WAGING WAR ON "UNEMPLOYABLES"?
RACE, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND MINIMUM

WAGES:
THE NEW EVIDENCE
Harry G. Hutchison*
ABSTRACT

Capturing both popular and academic imaginations, recent literature
contributions contest the standard treatment of minimum wage statutes
as vehicles that enlarge the economic and social dislocation of
vulnerable workers. A persistent strain of the current scholarship
dedicated to progressive labor ideology implies that minimum wages, or,
alternatively, living wage statutes, are necessary to preclude the
degradation of low-wage workers. The publication of Simon Deakin
and Frank Wilkinson's recent article, Minimum Wage Legislation,
constitutes yet another effort to destabilize the neoclassical consensus
that emphasizes the adverse employment effects of wage regulation.
Prescinding from orthodox economic analysis, Deakin and Wilkinson
insist that there is a good efficiency-based case for minimum wage
legislation. If the authors are correct, and if efficiency standing alone
supports their normative viewpoint, then the contention that such
legislation ought to be seen as a societal good might become tenable.
Unfortunately, their claims are highly doubtful. Perceived through
the lenses of American labor history, classical liberalism, Critical Race
Theory, and neoclassical economics, the authors' allegations signify the
capitulation of reasoned analysis to ideology. Rather than supporting the
interest of the public or of vulnerable workers, their starkly conventional
and progressive approach to labor law reform recalls John Stuart Mill's
embrace of Social Darwinism and consequent exclusion of inferior
classes of workers.
The authors' approach also verifies Mill's
observation that modern liberal democracy-operating consistently with
the goals of exclusion-is insufficient to protect disfavored groups and
individuals from the coercive power authorized by a majority or its
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hierarchs. Since Deakin and Wilkinson's credulous claims are in
harmony with more than a century of progressive policies, and since the
normative and prudential case for raising or retaining the minimum wage
remains weak, marginalized members of society have much to fear from
their analysis.
Minimum wage laws, . . . are often advocated by those who see
themselves as taking the side of the workers against their employers,
when in fact the employers may end up less harmed by such laws than
are the workers themselves, whose unemployment can deprive them of
both current income and the human capital that work experience could
for them and enable them to earn higher incomes in the
build up
1
future.
INTRODUCTION
Although the United States is beginning "to emerge from one of the
most devastating economic slides in [its] history," Americans are still
experiencing the highest rates of unemployment in the last fifty years.2
Exacerbating this state of affairs, substantial wealth and pension assets
have vanished while entire communities have been debilitated.3
Meanwhile, falling or stagnant wages, mounting employment
uncertainty, and escalating disparities between nonwhite and white
unemployment rates aggravate the troubles America's workers face.4 A
lively debate continues over who or what has caused America's latest
financial and economic implosion: politics and government policy5 or
risk-taking speculators and banks.6 There is also a renewed emphasis on
the necessity of government intervention and nostalgia for New Deal-era
law reforms despite the past and present impacts of the New Deal on
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. I am grateful to Elizabeth McKay
and Michael Yadanza for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to the Law and
Economics Center at George Mason University School of Law for funding this research. © Harry G.
Hutchison
1. THOMAS SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO THE ECONOMY 421
(3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS].
2. Gene R. Nichol, Foreword: Wages, Work, Privilege, and Legal Education, 5 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 2 (2011).
3. Id.
4. Harry G. Hutchison, What Workers Want or What LaborExperts Want Them to Want?, 26
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 799, 800 (2008) [hereinafter Hutchison, What Workers Want].
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction: A Crisis of Politics, Not Economics:
Complexity, Ignorance,and PolicyFailure,21 CRITICAL REV. 127, 128 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Anatomy of a Murder: Who KilledAmerica's Economy?,
21 CRITICAL REv. 329, 330 (2009).
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African Americans.7

Against this backdrop, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen offers a solid
defense of markets:
The freedom to exchange words, or goods, or gifts does not need
defensive justification in terms of their favorable but distant effects;
they are part of the way human beings in society live. . . . We have
good reasons to buy and sell, to exchange,
and to seek lives that can
8
flourish on the basis of transactions.

Sen is a reflective defender of markets, and he supplies a nuanced
view of income, wealth, and advantage. 9 For example, he shows that

women worldwide have been liberated through access to markets.' 0 This
is true despite the commitment of early progressive elites to statutory
innovation enforcing female inferiority. 1 While society's intentional
efforts to subordinate women and others have waned, 12 the human
yearning for regulation, not necessarily motivated by virtue ethics,
abounds in market economies.' 3 This appetite for regulation has surfaced
with explosive force in the domain of transactions in which human
capital is exchanged for wages, and many observers are dissatisfied with
the resulting outcomes. 14 If economics is more than "the theology of a
new religion of abundance" and human progress, 15 then it is likely that
7. Harry G. Hutchison, Racial Exclusion in the Mirrorof New Deal Responses to The Great
Crash, 15 CHAP. J. OF L. & POL'Y 5, 5-6 (2009-2010) [hereinafter Hutchison, Racial Exclusion].
8. DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE BOURGEOIS VIRTUES: ETHICS FOR AN AGE OF COMMERCE
29 (2007) (quoting AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 6, 112 (2000)).

9. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 253 (2009) ("[I]ncome or wealth is an inadequate
way of judging advantage ....
).
10. MCCLOSKEY, supranote 8, at29.
11. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 90
(2006) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION]. Justice Brandeis,

acting as a stalwart progressive before joining the U.S. Supreme Court, served as "the architect of
the detailed sociological studies" used to support differential treatment of women against a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Id. In the 1908 Supreme Court case Muller v. Oregon,
Brandeis, citing these studies, successfully defended an Oregon statute limiting hours of work for
women on grounds of innate female inferiority. Id.
12. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 8, at 30.
13. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Epistemic Integrity and the Environmental Future, 32
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 3 n.6 (2008) (explaining that virtue ethics place an emphasis on
human character).
14. See, e.g., Luca Enriques, Regulators' Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming
Reregulation of FinancialMarkets: One Reluctant Regulator's View, 30 U. PA J. INT'L L. 1147,
1151-52 (2009) (describing skepticism toward the increase in "do something" reforms from United
States and European Union regulators in response to the financial crisis).
15. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 8, at 196 (citing ROBERT NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION 267
(2001)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

3

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:25

all observers must take sides on important public policy debates armed
with more than a prudential calculation about overall wealth
maximization.
Within the United States, this debate takes place against a
background of cultural division reflecting a clash of orthodoxies,
signifying that "there is an interminable and unsettleable character of
much of what passes for [Americans'] contemporary moral and
philosophical debates. 16 In part, the character of public policy debates
in Western democracies reflects the failure of progressive aspirations.
As political philosopher Chantal Delsol clarifies through her studies of
"the spirit of late modernity," "modern man" has been "confounded,
dazed, and confused" by a growing recognition that the collapse of
communism and other "isms" has failed to provide a solution for his
anxieties. 17 The fall of these progressive ideologies has instead made
way for a "'return' of social and human problems that Progress was
supposed to have relegated to History's dustbin . . . ."8 Instead of
evolving toward the apex of Enlightenment ideas grounded in the belief
that progressives have been an essential part of modernity's inevitable
march toward permanent progress, modern man must deal with
"disconcerting shadows" after realizing that progress, in some final
collective sense, is a "debilitating illusion."' 9 Rather than witnessing the
birth of a new world order premised on the hopeful claim that "all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights," moderns
have observed a world order that features "a morass of moral ambiguity
and expediency. ' 20 As a consequence, modern man is now unsure of
how to face a future filled with doubt.21 Meanwhile, social scientists and
labor advocates continue to insist that uncertainty can be resolved
through more studies, particularly those supporting a greater role for
16. Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the FirstAmendment Through Union Dues Restrictions?,
10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 663, 674 (2008) [hereinafter Hutchison, Reclaiming the First

Amendment] (citing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY INMORAL THEORY 226 (2d
ed. 1984)).
17. Paul Seaton, Translator'sPreface to CHANTAL DELSOL, UNJUST JUSTICE: AGAINST THE
TYRANNY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at vii (Paul Seaton trans., 2008) [hereinafter Seaton,
Translator'sPreface].
18.

Id.

19. See Thomas Hibbs, Seeking with Groans: The Moral Universe of Film Noir, BOOKS &
CULTURE, Mar.- Apr. 2007, at 41, 41 (explaining the worldview of modernity prevalent in film
noir).
20.

DAVID ANDRESS, THE TERROR: CIVIL WAR IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1 (2005)

(quoting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and decrying "eugenic experimentation... and
the vile perversions of Darwinist science").
21. See Seaton, Translator'sPreface,supra note 17, at viii.
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government within society, the economy, and the world of work.22
Arguing against this tendency, social science critic Christopher Shannon
intuits that the effort of progressives to extract meaning from the study
of social science is "inherently self-defeating" because it problematizes
human life while concurrently breathing life into the "iatrogenic"
probability, a disease caused by the modem process of incessant
diagnosis and treatment.23 Uncertainty, in combination with the failure
of the modem process of quasi-scientific diagnosis, gives rise to
American gloom, which reflects the deduction that our world and its
foundational philosophical, moral, and spiritual assumptions have fallen
24
apart.
Since it is difficult to find agreement regarding "a complete,
transcendent, and immanent set of propositions about right and
wrong," 25 few principles can be fully legitimated against this twitchy
postmodern background. Nevertheless, it can be tentatively argued that
one of our greatest flaws is an increasing willingness to ignore those
trapped at the bottom of American life.26 As such, the pursuit of a
defensible moral position regarding wage regulation, including an
appraisal of the motivation and consequences of minimum wage
advocacy, is vitally important for vulnerable participants in the labor
market. This is particularly true during an epoch in which the nation
slowly recovers from its financial malaise while anger, both real and
manufactured, rages.27 Few groups are as vulnerable as young adults
without a high school diploma or young minorities.28 Furthermore, if we
gaze past America's borders, poor South Africans straining29to thrive in a
twenty-first century world are also particularly vulnerable.
22. See generally Wilfred M. McClay, Forewordto CHRISTOPHER SHANNON, CONSPICUOUS
CRITICISM: TRADITION, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND CULTURE IN MODERN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT,

at xi (rev. ed. 2006) (discussing Shannon's criticism of social science's proposed solutions for
American society and culture).
23. Id.
24. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality,Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the End
of Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1197-98 (2005).
25. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1229
(1979).
26. Nichol, supra note 2, at 1.
27. See id. at 3.
28. See SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 214 (explaining the results of empirical
studies that show that young, unskilled, and minority workers face the greatest reduction in
employment as a result of minimum wage laws).
29. Id. at 216-17 (quoting Sharon LaFraniere, Low Labor StandardLeads South Africans to
Export Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/13/world/low-labor-

standard-leads-south-africans-to-export-jobs.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm)
(illustrating
adverse employment effects of informal minimum wages on poor South Africans).
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Coinciding with rising levels of economic inequality that place
vulnerable workers at risk,30 the publication of Simon Deakin and Frank
Wilkinson's article, Minimum Wage Legislation,3 provides impetus to a
new body of social science research.32 This revisionist analysis largely
rejects times-series studies based upon the U.S. Current Population
Survey and favors a comparative approach that examines variations in
minimum wages between states.33 Eagerly embracing the supposed
demise of neoclassical theory, Deakin and Wilkinson create a revisionist
panegyric that justifies minimum wage law as an attractive labor reform
and income redistribution device,34 despite the existence of an economic
consensus that challenges the advisability of such a policy. 35 For
skeptics of the new body of research, the publication of Deakin and
Wilkinson's piece offers a fresh opportunity to reexamine the empirics
of the minimum wage and consider anew the foundational
presuppositions and enduring effects of progressive policies that in
pursuit of "social justice" were spawned by the belief that scientific
experimentation, when blended with coercive market intervention,
necessarily leads to social improvement and egalitarianism. On the
contrary, the instantiation of progressive paradigms, including minimum
wage regimes, may signify the pursuit of inadvertent or deliberate forms
of racial and gender subordination that resemble what the late Senator
Paul Wellstone labeled as "willful blindness," which "enable[s] a vibrant
and boastful democracy to take the economic travails of so many low30. See Nichol, supra note 2, at 2-3 (describing escalating racial wealth disparities).
31. Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Minimum Wage Legislation, in 2 LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 150 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
32. See, e.g., DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (1995); David Card, Using Regional Variation in Wages to
Measure the Effects of the FederalMinimum Wage, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 22, 22 (1992)
[hereinafter Card, Using Regional Variation in Wages]; David Card, Do Minimum Wages Reduce
Employment? A Case Study of California, 1987-1989, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 38, 38 (1992)
[hereinafter Card, Do Minimum Wages Reduce Employment?].
33. Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 155 (rejecting time-series studies because the
"employment effects are small and also highly sensitive to the choice of sample period").
34. Id. at 156 (stating that a "return to the neoclassical orthodoxy seems unlikely").
35. See, e.g., DAVID NEUMARK & WILLIAM L. WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES 286-88 (2008)
[hereinafter NEUMARK & WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES] (showing that minimum wages are an
ineffective social policy for aiding the poor, entail "disemployment effects" that are felt most
heavily by low-skilled workers, discourage human capital formation, increase prices for products
frequently consumed by low-income families, and do little to raise the incomes of poor and nearpoor families); Richard V. Burkhauser, Kenneth A. Couch & David C. Wittenburg, Who Minimum
Wage Increases Bite: An Analysis Using Monthly Datafrom the SIPP and the CPS, 67 S.ECON. J.
16, 30-31 (2000) (finding that minimum wage increases consistently have a significant negative
employment effect on vulnerable groups within the labor market, and further confirming the
"neoclassical predictions that minimum wage increases significantly reduce employment").
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wage working Americans" off the table.36 Instead of giving careful
consideration to the difficulties facing low-wage workers, much of the
liberal/modem calculus that sustains progressive labor ideology
(including wage regulation) substitutes self-congratulation for defensible
policy analysis.37
Although Deakin and Wilkinson's scholarship typifies the work of
a growing cohort of scholars who see minimum wage regimes as
innately good, an achievement worth defending on the basis of
progressive architecture, 38 progressive labor paradigms do not seem to
be working for marginalized Americans. For instance, Henry Louis
Gates, Jr. and Comel West have documented evidence that "[m]ore than
half of all black males between twenty-five and thirty-four are jobless or
'underemployed."' ' 39 Equally disturbing are statistics suggesting that
black males receive prison sentences rather than college diplomas at a
ratio of one hundred to one.4 ° Moreover, while the evidentiary record
shows that dramatic racial differences in unemployment did not exist
prior to 1930, the unemployment rate for non-whites has risen relative to
whites ever since. 4 1 These disparities remain today, thus further
isolating African Americans.42 While various explanations abound,
economist Glenn Loury observes that the unemployment gap is caused
by a "substantial gap in skills between blacks and whites [which] is itself
the result of processes of social exclusion . . . ., In the 1990s, for
example, "the size of the black underclass [grew] disproportionately,"
reinforced by the rise in the black unemployment rate.44 Between
August 2010 and August 2011, for example, the unemployment rate for
white workers shifted from 8.6 percent to 7.9 percent, while the rate for

36. Nichol, supranote 2, at 1.
SELF37. See generally, THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED:
CONGRATULATION AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY 1-2 (1995) [hereinafter, SOWELL, VISION OF THE
ANOINTED] (stating that even when public policy is debated, the conclusions are often reached
based on inherent assumptions and narrow visions of social processes).
38. See David E. Bernstein & Thomas C. Leonard, Excluding Unfit Workers: Social Control
Versus Social Justice in the Age of Economic Reform, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 186-87
(2009) (explaining the eugenic benefits of wage regulation under progressive labor ideology).
39. HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR. & CORNEL WEST, THE FUTURE OF THE RACE 24 (1996).
40. Id. at 24-25.
41. RICHARD VEDDER & LOWELL GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT AND

272-273 (1993).
42. Harry G. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice or Employee Forged Choice? Race in the
Mirror of Exclusionary Hierarchy, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 369, 371 (2010) [hereinafter Hutchison,
Employee Free Choice].
GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA

43.

GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 101 (2002).

44. GATES & WEST, supranote 39, at xii.
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blacks increased from 16.3 percent to 17.0 percent. 45 Nor is this dire
picture confined to the United States, as evidence from Nigeria and
South Africa indicates that the costs of labor law reform are borne most
Given the persistent
heavily by the poor and marginalized.4 6
disadvantage experienced by members of minority groups, perhaps they
can be forgiven for seeking evidence of prejudice or racial animus that is
directly attributable to the implementation of progressive suppositions.
With this situation facing many minorities, as well as African Americans
in particular, it ought to be commonplace to challenge the deficiencies of
the progressive paradigm. This article expands the literature as part of
an ongoing effort to lay bare the pernicious economic and moral
consequences that attend the implementation of progressive ideals.47
Placed within this morally dubious context, Minimum Wage Legislation
represents a conservative effort to protect the presuppositions of labor
law reform architects and labor union advocates from justifiable
criticism, rather than offering a fresh contribution to the literature.
Part I situates minimum wage advocacy within progressive labor
ideology, American labor history, and mankind's quest for perfection as
a prelude to examining Deakin and Wilkinson's various claims and
contentions. Emphasizing the plight of African American workers in
particular, this analysis concentrates on the assumptions and
consequences of progressive architecture, as well as on the objectives
and goals of progressives in the realm of economic and labor legislation,
often referred to as "social justice" legislation.48 Part II reviews Deakin
and Wilkinson's analysis. Part III refracts the authors' claims and
contentions through a prism provided by contrary empirical evidence,
45. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Table A-2: Employment Status of the Civilian Populationby Race,
http://data.bls.gov/cgiOF
LAB.
STATISTICS,
BUREAU
U.S.
Sex,
and Age,
bin/print.pl/news.release/empsit.t02.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2011) (not seasonally adjusted).
46. See, e.g., SOWELL, BASIC ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 216-17 (describing the effects of
artificially high wages on employment in both countries and indicating that at least some South
African companies are expanding output by moving some of their production to Poland, which is
unlikely to benefit black workers in South Africa).
47. See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"? From Plessy v. Ferguson to
New Deal Labor Law, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 1-2 (2011) [hereinafter Hutchison, Waging War on
the "Unfit"] (critiquing PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE

SUPREME COURT AND BUCK V.BELL 7-19 (2008)); Harry G. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values,
and Corporate Law: A Reply to Greenfield, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437, 443 (2010) [hereinafter
Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values] (criticizing Kent Greenfield, Corporate Law and the
Rhetoric of Choice, in 24 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS: TOWARD

SOCIAL JUSTICE 61 (Dana L. Gold ed., 2009)).
48. See, e.g., Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13
COLUM. L. REv. 294, 295 (1913) (defining "social justice" legislation as "[s]tate law[s] involving a
social or economic question").
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American labor history, and neoclassical theory. Although Deakin and
Wilkinson suggest otherwise, 49 it is unfortunate that United States
courts, like much of society, have rarely intervened to thwart the
expansion of social justice legislation.50 Even though such legislation
imposes a substantial burden on society and saddles vulnerable
individuals and groups with disproportionate harm, 51 most courts and
commentators remain unmoved. After revisiting the entire record,
impartial observers (as well as commentators committed to redressing
economic and social injustice) ought to be wary of Deakin and
Wilkinson's hopeful claims, which indicate that wage regulation delivers
positive freedom and economic relief to low-wage workers.12 Such
claims, when stripped of the patina of progress, consist of contradiction
and coercion that punish and further disadvantage marginalized
Americans, in addition to expanding racial disparities.5 3
I.

CONTROLLING THE "UNFIT"

A. Prolegomena
On one account, "[d]angers to a society may be mortal without
being immediate. One such danger is the prevailing social vision of our
time-and the dogmatism with which the ideas, assumptions, and
attitudes behind that vision are held., 54 Deakin and Wilkinson's article
functions as a plinth supporting the prevailing vision of our time: the
necessity of government intervention within markets.
Before
examining their claims and the empirical evidence they discount, it is
important to examine the history of progressive thought that led to the
creation of America's minimum wage movement. Understanding
minimum wage law requires a brief review of progressive impulses,
progressive labor ideology, biology, and America's remarkable history
49. See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 152 (discussing the so-called Lochner era).
50. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 48, at 294-95 (stating that out of 560 Supreme Court cases
involving the validity of social justice legislation from 1887-1911, the Court only declared two state
laws unconstitutional, in addition to the Lochner decision).
51.

See Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit," supranote 47, at 33.

52. See generally Deakin & Wilkinson, supranote 31, at 155-56 (discussing empirical studies
that found that minimum wages had positive effects on wages and employment).
53.

See, e.g., Walter Williams, Punished by Minimum Wages, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, May

11,2011, at All (discussing a study showing that each 10% increase in a state or federal minimum
wage decreased employment of white males by 2.5%, Hispanic males by 1.2%, and black males by

6.5%).
54.

SOWELL, VISION OF THE ANOINTED, supranote 37, at 1.

55.

See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 167.
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of racial subjugation.
Scholars Black, 56 Bernstein, 57 Bernstein and
Leonard, 58 Epstein,5 9 and Moreno 6° have made enormous contributions

to the literature by documenting the reach, consequences, and
philosophic deficiencies of the progressive movement. The picture that
emerges from their work is complex yet ultimately repulsive as
progressives sought to remake the world by taking control of the "unfit"
and the "undeserving," who were seen as obstacles to the establishment
of the New Republic.61
B. ProgressiveLabor Ideology and the "Unemployables"
And how will the New Republic treat the inferior races? How will it
deal with the black? . . .the yellow man? . . .the Jew? . . . those

swarms of black, and brown, and dirty-white, and yellow people, who
do not come into the new needs of efficiency? Well, the world is a
world, and not a charitable institution, and I take it they will have to
62
go....
As this quote from H. G. Wells demonstrates, humanity has been

"[c]ontinuously catapulted from misery to exhilaration and back," and
has therefore "repeatedly struggled to overcome vulnerability and
improve upon its sense of strength." 63 Our instinct is to "play God," an
impulse that too frequently is not just to progress but to suppress people

who society has deemed inferior. 64 Although racism and group hatred
have existed in most cultures throughout history, it took thousands of

years for these hostilities to permeate scientific thought and therefore
rationalize disparaging actions against the despised.65 Since power tends
56. See EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA'S CAMPAIGN TO
CREATE A MASTER RACE (2003).
57. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001) [hereinafter
BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS].
58. See Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38.
59. See EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11.
60. See PAUL D. MORENO, BLACK AMERICANS AND ORGANIZED LABOR: A NEW HISTORY
(2006).
61. See, e.g., Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 180 ("Progressive economists and their
reform allies offered uplift only to those groups they deemed deserving of work, arguing that in the
name of social control the labor force should be rid of unfit workers: the immigrants, African

Americans, women, and other 'defectives"').
62. Stephen M. Barr, The Devil's Chaplain Confounded, FIRST THINGS, Aug.-Sept. 2004, at
25, 25-26 (quoting H. G. Wells).
63. BLACK, supra note 56, at 9.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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naturally toward manipulation and control,66 it would be unwise to claim
that social groups, public intellectuals, and institutions operating during
the Progressive Era invented contempt as a weapon against the "unfit."
However, this longing to transmute contempt into subordinating action
reinforced by pseudo-science intensified the effort to acquire power,
which "in its most coarse expressions would exploit, subjugate, and even
enslave." 67 Putatively possessing an aristocracy of knowledge and
refusing to offer a completely consistent philosophic edifice, American
progressives campaigned "against 'undesirables' with great subtlety and
sophistication., 68 They used noble notions of public interest and fairness
to claim that their programs and policies actually helped the
underprivileged citizens they targeted. 69 Thus, some commentators
''continue to insist that the New Deal was a positive step toward social
70
justice and a new world order."
Stemming from the notion that, "in the struggle to survive in a
harsh world, many humans were not only less worthy, [but] actually
destined to wither," progressives argued that preserving the needy in
society was a potentially harmful act.7 ' Consistent with this thesis, early
progressives "believed strongly in eugenics and presumed that the state
could create a pure race, a society of new men,",72 labeling conservative
opponents to eugenics as "social Darwinists." 73 Progressive ideals,
infused with Herbert Spencer's thinking, were "essentially a variant of
English utilitarianism, with a more developed argument on progress
through evolution., 74 In fairness, Darwinian thought, as Spencer
exemplified, could be taken in either a laissez-faire or statist direction.75
Progressives rejected "the notion of a republic founded on the natural
rights tradition in favor of a living constitution . . . and ultimately
66. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, To CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY,
POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD 188 (2010).

&

67. Id.
68. Hutchison, Waging War on the "'Unfit"?,supranote 47, at 22.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. BLACK, supra note 56, at 12-13.
72. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 42, at 380-81 (citing JONAH GOLDBERG,
LIBERAL FASCISM: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEFT, FROM MUSSOLINI TO THE
POLITICS OF CHANGE 114 (2009)).
73. GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 257. In fact, progressives created the notion of "social

Darwinism," meaning "anyone who opposed Sidney Webb's notion that the state must aggressively
'interfere' in the reproductive order of society." Id.
74.

RONALD J. PESTRITTO, WOODROW WILSON AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN LIBERALISM 11

(2005) (citing BERNARD CRICK, THE AMERICAN SCIENCE OF POLITICS: ITS ORIGINS AND
CONDITIONS 41-46 (1964)).

75. Id.
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succumbed to the fiction that progress required the supervision of an
educated class groomed for leadership. 76 Hence, progressive elites
proposed selective breeding and emphasized human perfection in
combination with centralized power and restructured economic
systems.77 Seeking to change the structure of society for the better,
progressives endeavored to supervise evolution in ways that would
fundamentally alter society: first, by substituting a statist economy for
the free markets, 78 and second, by exchanging or eliminating "unfit"
citizens in favor of "desirable" ones. 79 Described more fully below, this
remarkable intuition set the stage for subordinating action by
governments.
While not all progressives favored the diminution of economic
opportunities and political rights for marginalized Americans, 80 it is
undeniable that, for some, remaking the world required the liquidation of81
what was seen as America's "black and sinister polyglot population.
Typifying this radical viewpoint and attesting to the transformative
power of hierarchy born from racial supremacy, prominent author and
devout progressive H. G. Wells saw Franklin Delano Roosevelt as "the
most effective transmitting instrument possible for the coming of the
new world order., 82 Believing that "government must submit to the
Darwinian theory of organic life," progressives saw the state as "a living
thing freighted by irresistible impulses and requiring ever-expanding
power as part of the natural evolutionary process. 83 Corresponding
with this proposition, "[g]ovemmental 'experimentation,' the watchword
of pragmatic liberals from Dewey and Wilson to FDR, was the social
analogue to evolutionary adaptation.' 84
It is difficult to fully appreciate the inseparable connection between
race, the demands of progress, and American Progressivism without
briefly reviewing the history of the Progressive movement's leader,
76. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, supra note 47, at 466 (citing PESTRITTO, supra
note 74, at 11-12).
77. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 42, at 381 (citing GOLDBERG, supra note
72, at 270-77).
78. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, supra note 47, at 466.
79. See Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supranote 47, at 4.
80.

See EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 102-

03 (showing that some progressives opposed Woodrow Wilson's attempt to subjugate blacks).
81. GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 135 (quoting H. G. WELLS, THE WAR IN THE AIR 115
(Kessinger Publ'g 2004) (1908)).
82. Id. (quoting H. G. Wells).
83. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 42, at 381 (citing GOLDBERG, supra note
72, at 86).
84.

GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 86.
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Woodrow Wilson. 85
After winning the 1912 election, Wilson
"immediately set about to convert the Democratic Party into a
progressive party and, in turn, make it the engine for a transformation of
America. '' 86 In 1913, he vowed to appoint only progressives to his
administration.87 It is doubtful that these maneuvers, which ultimately
led to the inception of the minimum wage movement, could be seen as a
positive development when examined from the perspectives of African
Americans, classical liberals, 88 Critical Race theorists, 89 or neoclassical
economists. On the contrary, and in sharp contrast with President Calvin
Coolidge's call for religious and racial tolerance during his 1924 election
campaign, 90 Wilson assertively implemented "an agenda that created
socially constructed racial categories, enforced racial disparity, and
liberty 92 and
advanced racial stigma." 9' It also diminished human
93
economy.
ultimately placed a regulatory drag on the
Emblematic of Wilson's approach to race was his "advocacy of
progressive imperialism in order to subjugate, and thereby elevate, lesser
races." 94 Unlike classical liberals who fought racial discrimination,"

85.

Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supranote 42, at 380.

86.
87.

GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 104.

Id.
88. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Bean, Introduction to THE INDEP. INST., RACE & LIBERTY IN
AMERICA: THE ESSENTIAL READER 1, 2-7 (Jonathan J. Bean ed., 2009) (explaining that classical
liberals were consistent advocates of racial freedom).
89. See Harry Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage
Regimes: Exploding the Power of Myth, Fantasy, and Hierarchy, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 93, 99
(1997) [hereinafter Hutchison, Toward a CriticalRace] ("Race crits endorse extensive sociolegal
tradeoffs favoring people of color, including deployment of a culturally informed intent test[,]
[w]hile ... classical-liberal reformists look to the effects of allegedly racist laws in order to find
discrimination"); Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, CriticalRace Theory and Classical-Liberal
Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 787 (1994)
("Because it brings an 'outsider' perspective to the discussion, [Critical Race Theory] has
substantial transformative potential.").
90. See Calvin Coolidge, Coolidge Denounces White Racism (1924), in THE INDEP. INST.,
RACE & LIBERTY IN AMERICA: THE ESSENTIAL READER 147, 147 (Jonathan J. Bean ed., 2009). It is
noteworthy that Coolidge's Democratic opponent, segregationist John W. Davis, is best known for
defending segregation in Brown v. Board of Education. Id.
91. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supranote 42, at 380.
92. See, e.g., Hoover Desegregates the Commerce Department (1928), in THE INDEP. INST.,
RACE & LIBERTY IN AMERICA: THE ESSENTIAL READER 154, 154 (Jonathan J. Bean ed., 2009)
(describing Wilson's successful effort to segregate government offices).
93. Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing the New Deal
Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 595, 650 (2003) (illuminating the failures of Wilson's
disciple, FDR, whose attempt to supply centrally planned price controls and production limits
caused a massive six to eleven percent decline in America's GNP).
94. GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 83.
95. Bean, supra note 88, at 1.
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Wilson, along with other academics, was convinced that social progress,
inevitable as it was, had to "take into account the innate differences
between the races" because the "various races were at different stages of
evolution." 96 A necessary predicate for lasting democracy was,
according to Wilson, "homogeneity of race and community of thought
and purpose among the people. 97 Although Wilson, America's
preeminent liberal, had a historical reputation as a "far-sighted
progressive, ' '98 and despite the fact that modem liberals consider
themselves highly enlightened on the issue of race, 99 the record shows
that in addition to his commitment to Darwinian jurisprudence10 0 and
eugenics,'0 1 Wilson was a "racist retrograde."' 1 2 Driven to attain social
progress, and effectively presuming that Africans and South Americans
were "savages,"'0 3 he insisted that giving blacks the right to vote was
"the foundation of every evil in this country.' 10 4 Matching this intuition,
it was no coincidence that the U.S. Civil Service was resegregated
during Wilson's Progressive regime. 0 5 In addition, Wilson's influential
views set the stage for the implementation of a progressive labor law
06
reform agenda that ultimately included the federal minimum wage,'
Assistant Secretary of the
which was implemented by Wilson's former
10 7
FDR.
successor,
ideological
Navy and his
96.
97.

98.
99.

GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 260.
PESTRITTO, supra note 74, at 73.
EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 102.
GOLDBERG, supranote 72, at 243.

100. David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in
HistoricalPerspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 816-817, n. 89 (1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, Philip
Sober Controlling Philip Drunk] (highlighting Wilson's desire to "interpret the Constitution
according to the Darwinian principle" and his belief that "government is not a machine, but a living
thing.., accountable to Darwin").
101. GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 254-56 (showing that Wilson was a forthright defender of
eugenics based on a social vision requiring people to organize themselves into collective spiritual
and biological units). See also LOMBARDO, supra note 47, at 26 (describing Wilson as a "eugenics
enthusiast" and noting that, while serving as governor, Wilson signed New Jersey's sexual surgery
law, which was enacted on grounds of eugenics).
102. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVE REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note I1, at 102
(quoting Charles Paul Freund, DixiecratsTriumphant: The Menacing Mr. Wilson, REASON ONLINE
(Dec. 18, 2002), http://reason.com/archives/2002/12/18/dixiecrats-triumphant).
103.

GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 260.

104. Id. at 84.
105. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 102.
106. GOLDBERG, supra note 74, at 220 (showing that Wilson's government intruded deeply
into the private sector in unprecedented ways and launched an effort, carried forward by FDR, of
"turning the economy into a 'cooperative' enterprise where labor, business, and government sat
around a table and hashed things out on their own").
107. See id. at 126 (describing Roosevelt's tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under
leading progressive and notorious racist Josephus Daniels).
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Unlike classical liberalism, which requires a limited government in
order to protect individual rights and liberties, progressives believed in
an expansive role for government grounded in the proposition that
society was one indivisible whole that left no room for those who did not
want to comply. 108 Early progressives were provoked by the deduction
that a unified state required an increasingly centralized regulatory
apparatus.' 0 9 Dedicating themselves to societal advancement and the
evisceration of social evil, they were seduced by the temptation to see
science as a vehicle "[t]o forge the new science of human oppression-a
They believed that uniting the disciplines of
race science."" 0
socioeconomics, philosophy, biology, and the law would change the
world for the better, perhaps forever."'
Prescinding from this noxious brew, progressives became
"enthusiastic biologizers" and "elitist[s]."''1 2 As a result, in "its origins
and its consequences, the Progressive Era was both liberal and
conservative."" 13 Bernstein and Leonard recapitulate this development:
Their liberal (progressive) instincts led them to call for social justice,
to uplift the poor and disenfranchised. Their conservative instincts led
them to call for social control, to impose order upon the causes of
economic and social disorder. As elitists, the progressives believed
that intellectuals should guide social and economic progress, a belief
erected upon two subsidiary faiths: a faith in the disinterestedness and
incorruptibility of the experts who would run the welfare state they
envisioned, and a faith that expertise could not only serve the social
good, but also identify it.114
From the Progressive Era into the New Deal and continuing into the
current epoch, progressives have a rather mixed record in reducing
human subordination, despite their ambition to serve the social good.
First, this record reflects the fact that progressive intellectuals-turnedNew Dealers have often enacted programs without seeing the entire
picture. 15 Operating at times with either tunnel vision or willful
blindness, they focused "their attention exclusively on the beneficiaries
108. Id. at 87-88.
109. See, e.g., PESTRITTO, supra note 74, at 71-73 (discussing Woodrow Wilson's views on
unity and modem democracy).
110. BLACK, supranote 56, at 9.
111. Id.
112. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 179.
113. Hutchison, Choice, ProgressiveValues, supranote 47, at 438.
114. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 179-80.
115.

See EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 72.
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of their programs, be they union members or farmers, while taking no
note of the adverse effects that their programs had on the parties
excluded from the market."' 1 6 Second, progressives were often
hampered by overconfidence in both themselves and the state. For
example, during the Progressive Era, hopeful progressives were
provoked by asylums where mentally ill and handicapped patients
passively rotted away, "often spending their days restrained by
'
camisoles and straitjackets and their nights locked into covered cribs." 17
Progressives entered this arena armed with policy initiatives that were
reinforced by coupling a "blithe self-confidence in [their] own capacity
to design effective" programs with a "dangerous faith in the benevolence
of the state and its agents."' 18 Moreover, it was precisely the
commitment of progressives to expanding the scope of state action' 19
that often exacerbated the exclusion and mistreatment of individuals and
groups that were seen as threats to the vitality of the nation. "°
Blinded by doctrinal assumptions and standing on a morally
wobbly superstructure erected by experts, "many progressives saw the
contemporary social and economic position of [undesirables] as the
irremediable, inevitable effect of Darwinism."' 12 Provoked by quasireligious and pseudo-scientific imagery, progressives forged a link
between economic reform, socialism, Prohibition, eugenics, and other
elements of the progressive agenda in order to achieve their vision of the
"New Jerusalem."' 2 2 Seeking national salvation through this faith-based
agenda, American labor reformers often demanded the exclusion of
defective groups from American labor markets, 123 impelled by the
hypothesis that "unfit workers wrongly lowered the wages and
employment of racially superior groups.' 24 For reformers, the threat
posed by low-wage races was two-fold: first, they threatened American
wage levels, and second, their putatively greater fertility threatened the
health and the survival of the Anglo-Saxon race. 125 Premised on the
116. Id.
117. Andrew Scull, Progressive Dreams, Progressive Nightmares: Social Control in 20th
CenturyAmerica, 33 STAN. L. REv. 575, 576-77 (1981).
118. Id.at 577.
119. Id.
120. See generally Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 47, at 31 (discussing
the implementation of labor law as a weapon used by progressives to displace "unworthy" and
"unemployable" groups).
121. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 42, at 381.
122. See GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 219.
123. See Bernstein & Leonard, supranote 38, at 180.
124. Id. at 177.
125. Id.at 182.
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claim that "persons of inferior stock outbreed their biological betters,' 2 6
progressives "judged an impressive array of human groups, male Angloexcepted, to be unworthy of work, or
Saxon heads of 2household
'unemployable."",1 7 And who were the "unemployables"? Those
earned less than
individuals "who, owing to putative hereditary debility,
'1' 28
wage."
'living
a
called
reformers
what American
Taking their cues from the work of Fabian socialists such as Sidney
and Beatrice Webb, progressives were propelled by this centripetal
assumption: workers who received less than the "living wage," and
employers who paid less, were parasites. 129 Such parasites consisted of
"children, the aged, and the child-bearing women[,] ... the sick and the
crippled, the idiots and lunatics, the epileptic, the blind and the deaf and
dumb," immigrants, and members of minority ethnic and racial
groups. 30 This irrepressible insight-making wages a function of living
standards-"opened the door to the eugenic claim that immigrant groups
were hereditarily predisposed to low standards of living," along with the
conviction that Anglo-Saxon workers were more productive yet would
be displaced by the Chinese, who were racially disposed to work for less
pay. 13 1 Building on this astonishing theology and impelled to extirpate
"parasites," economist John R. Commons argued that "[t]he Jewish
sweatshop is the tragic penalty paid by that ambitious race.' 3 2 For
Commons, permitting inferior races to work engendered an economic
competition that lowered wages since "[c]ompetition has no respect for
superior races," leading the race with the lowest level of necessities to
displace the others.133 "Because race, not productivity, determined
living standards, Commons could populate his low-wage-races category
with the industrious and lazy alike." 1 34 According to Commons,
fickle,' which explained why
"African Americans. .. were 'indolent and
' 35
slavery was defensible, even necessary."'
The widespread acceptance of such modem and highly racialized

126. Id.
127. Id. at 180 (quoting Thomas C. Leonard, "More Merciful and Not Less Effective":
Eugenics and American Economics in the ProgressiveEra, 35 HIST. POL. ECON. 687, 702 (2003)).

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 785 (2d ed.
1920)).

131.

Id. at 181.

132.

Id. (quoting JOHN R. COMMONS, RACES AND IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICA 148 (1907)).

133. Id. (quoting COMMONS, supranote 132, at 151)).
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting COMMONS, supra note 132, at 136)).
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views 136 begged the question of what was to be done about the large
numbers of inferior people who might begin to outbreed superior races.
Premised on the irresistible judgment that law must "take lessons from
biology,"' 137 new legal doctrines and innovations surfaced. Three
popular solutions emerged in response to the urgent need to curtail the
growth of inferior people: eugenics, 38 gender-specific labor standards, 3 9
and minimum wage and labor regulation. 140 On doctrinal, practical,
philosophical, and moral levels, these proposals were both overlapping
and inextricably related.
First consider eugenics. Consistent with this moral imperative,
"[t]he American Economic Association (AEA), founded in 1885, almost
immediately began offering annual prizes for the best essay on the evils
of unrestricted immigration.""'a' This immigration issue "concerned not
numbers, but blood," as leading thinkers were persuaded that the "core
of the problem ...[was] one of race and eugenics.' ' 142 They were driven
to prevent the Anglo-Saxon stock from being overwhelmed by racially
inferior "defectives, delinquents and dependents." 43 Believing that
"social progress is 'a higher law than equality,"' progressive leaders
"proposed the 'eradication of the vicious and inefficient."" 144 Operating
in stark contrast to Lochnerian liberty-of-contract jurisprudence, which
was invoked to justify expanding constitutional protection of African
Americans and women, 145 the social progress movement reached its

136. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 1-2 (4th ed. 2000)
(explaining that "[r]ace, racialization, and racism are largely modem-day concepts" that ultimately
lead to "the assignment of negative value to the traits commonly associated with a particular race
and the subordinate ranking of that race on the social hierarchy").
137. LOMBARDO, supra note 47, at 44 (quoting C. B. Davenport, MarriageLaws and Customs,
in PROBLEMS IN EUGENICS: PAPERS COMMUNICATED TO THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL EUGENICS

CONGRESS 155 (1912)).
138. See, e.g., Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 183-85 (describing the race-suicide
thesis and the movement among elites to stamp out the unemployables).
139. Seeid. at 188-90.
140. See id. at 186-87.
141. Id. at 183 (citing JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 41 (1978)).
142. Id. (quoting Irving Fisher, Impending Problems of Eugenics, 13 SCI. MONTHLY 214, 227

(1921)).
143.

Id.

144. Id. at 183-84 (quoting SIMON N. PATTEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THOUGHT: A
STUDY IN THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 302-03 (1899)).
145. Lochner: A Notorious Case Reconsidered, CATO POL'Y REP., May-June 2011, at 17,
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policyreport/v33n3/cprv33n3-7.pdf (describing DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE

REFORM (2011)).
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apotheosis in Justice Holmes' peroration in Buck v. Bell,146 which
defended the benefits of majoritarianism, racialized science, and human
exclusion. 47 This social vision, predicated in part on the growing fear
of "race suicide,"'148 culminated in the conclusion that the state has
virtually unlimited power to regulate activities (such as the work hours
of healthy bakers and able-bodied women) and to 49
control the "socially
salpingectomies.1
discretionary
through
inadequate"
Second, operating in a similar vein by focusing on gender-specific
solutions for "undesirables," Florence Kelley, one of the most influential
U.S. labor reformers of the Progressive Era, "endorsed the Victoria,
Australia, minimum-wage law as 'redeeming the sweated trades.' It did
so by preventing the 'unbridled competition' of the unemployable, the
'women, children, and Chinese [who] were reducing all the employees
to starvation."" 150 Consistent with this thesis, Louis Brandeis, a
progressive lawyer and later a Supreme Court justice, spent a good deal
of his career as an attorney, arguing that government had a duty to
protect women through minimum wage laws and other regulations
governing the employment of women.'
Since women, in his view,
were unfit for work, the notion that a woman stood on the same plane
with a man and had the right to enter into contracts was simply "gilded
sophistry."'' 5 2 As Bernstein and Leonard make clear:
[T]he original progressives were in fact deeply ambivalent about
women's participation in the labor force-and sometimes hostile to it.
The reform case against women's market work, couched as it often
was in the language of protection, was subtler than the eugenic hysteria
directed at immigrants and mental and moral defectives. Nonetheless,
as with other groups they deemed unemployable, leading progressives
portrayed women's labor-force participation as socially and
146. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
147. See Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 47, at 28 (discussing Justice
Holmes' views drawn from a number of sources, including his opinion in Buck v. Bell and the
Lochner case).
148. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 182 (defining race suicide in Edward A. Ross's
words as the situation in which "[t]he higher race quietly and unmurnuringly eliminates itself rather
than endure individually the bitter competition it has failed to ward offby collective action").
149. See id. at 182-83 (discussing progressive reformers' efforts to create scientific methods
for identifying low-wage workers and to implement legislation that would exclude social inferiors
from work and target them for eugenics).
150. Id. at 188 (quoting Florence Kelley, Minimum-Wage Boards, 17 AM. J. Soc. 303, 304
(1911)).
151. TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LtvING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW
8 (2010).
152. Id.
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economically destructive-a threat to the wages of deserving workers
(white, male heads of household), a threat to the sanctity of the home,
and a threat to the eugenic health of the race.153
Hence, the coercive power of the state ought to be deployed to
protect "deserving" white
men by constraining the liberty of the "weaker
154
living.
a
earn
to
sex"
Finally, turning to the pseudo-scientific case for minimum wages, it
should be noted that during the early part of the twentieth century,
"[m]inimum-wage legislation, passed by several states beginning with
Massachusetts in 1912 was the sine qua non of progressive labor reform,
and progressive economists championed minimum wages." 155 Fostering
this perspective was the work of eugenically minded progressives who
"advocated minimum wages precisely because binding minimums would
cause job losses."15 6 Tempted by the rather conventional deduction "that
minimum-wage induced job loss was a social benefit because it
performed the eugenic service of ridding the labor force of the
'unemployable,"",1 57 progressive hierarchs sought to remake the world by
controlling wages and population growth. 58
Influential British
intellectuals Sidney and Beatrice Webb deserve singular recognition for
the success of this move. They observed: "With regard to certain
sections of the population [the unemployable], this unemployment is not
a mark of social disease, but actually of social health."' 159 Flaunting his
talent for pulverizing rhetoric, Sidney Webb opined that "of all ways of
dealing with these unfortunate parasites . . . the most ruinous to the

community is to allow them unrestrainedly to compete as wage earners.
. . ,,160 As members of the philosophic vanguard obligated by a duty to
protect deserving workers from the revolting menace of competition
from "defectives" and the "unfit,"
progressive architects yearned to
161
less."'
for
work
to
"illegal
it
make
Captured by this surging zeitgeist, Columbia's Henry Rogers
153. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 188.
154. See SANDEFUR, supra note 151, at 8 (highlighting Brandeis' argument in Muller v.
Oregon that "government had to protect the weaker sex, to aid women in their natural roles as wives
and mothers").
155. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 186.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 186-87.
159. Id. at 186 (quoting WEBB & WEBB, supra note 130, at 785).
160.

Id. (citing Sidney Webb, The Economic Theory of a Legal Minimum Wage, 20 J. POL.

ECON. 973, 992 (1912)).
161. See id.
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Seager, future president of the American Economic Association and a
leading progressive economist, offered a clear social vision of what
should happen to those who, even after remedial training, could not earn
the legal minimum. 62 Evoking H. G. Wells' admonition, he stated: "If
we are to maintain a race that is to be made up of capable, efficient and
independent individuals and family groups we must courageously cut off
lines of heredity that have been proved to be undesirable by isolation or
sterilization ....
,,163 Gleaming with racial animus, Progressive Era trade
unionists "used local ordinances controlling licensing and apprenticeship
to keep blacks out of their trades," or, in a concession to the humanity ' of
64
African Americans, "forced blacks into segregated auxiliary unions."'
Racial hostility, inescapably tied to union exclusion, flourished a decade
later, "[a]s the [Great Depression] worsened, [and] undesirable jobs
traditionally held by blacks became attractive to whites., 165 As a
consequence of unionists' tenacious surrender to racial hierarchy, the
66
displacement of African American workers became a serious problem.
This approach, grounded at the intersection of biology and the law,
was not unique to the United States, as the history of pre-Mandela South
Africa shows.1 6 7 White South African craft unionists, like their
American counterparts, demanded an exclusion of blacks that was
consistent with the evolving tenets of a racial hierarchy betraying its
progressive assumptions. 168 Progressive aspirations transformed into
eugenic-tinged legislation, gender-specific wage regulation, and
minimum wages. Whether within the United States or elsewhere, these
various moves were largely designed to solve the problem of the
"unemployables" by excluding and subjugating them. Thriving under
the broad banners of biology and manifest destiny, these propositions
sustained a shrewd calculus that led, as the next subsection shows, to
labor law reform, which included federal, as well as a growing number
of state and local, minimums.

162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Henry R. Seager, The Minimum Wage as Part of a Programfor Social
Reform, 48 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 3, 10 (1913)).

164. MORENO, supra note 60, at 96.
165. Id. at 163.
166. Hutchison, Toward a CriticalRace, supra note 89, at 120-21 (highlighting the prevalence
of discriminatory treatment of African Americans throughout the history of American labor unions
and the labor movement's "commitment to the norms of separation and white supremacy").
167. See id. at 126-29.
168. Id. at 127.
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C. THE FLSA
Rejecting the idea that underpaid workers can exercise their power
of exit, which plainly operates as an abuse-limiting device for
employees, 169 "[e]very country in the world has established a complex
system of laws and institutions intended to protect the interests of
workers and to help assure a minimum standard of living for its
population."' 170 The theory favors state intervention because "free labor
markets are imperfect" and provide an opportunity for employers to
extract rents by abusing workers, which is a source of "injustice and
inefficiency.",17 1 Predicated on such theories, the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), 172 enacted more than seventy years ago, epitomizes an
explosion of government intervention facilitated by a flurry of statutory
President
Hoover's
during
commenced
that
enactments
73
The FLSA's stated purpose is to constrain "labor
administrations.'
conditions detrimental to maintenance of the minimum standard of
living . 74. . without substantially curtailing employment or earning
1

power."
The FLSA represents an explicit commitment to low-wage workers
putatively protecting them from wage theft1 75 in accordance with the
premise that "unregulated

.

. labor conditions ... negatively affected

the 'health, efficiency and general well-being' of workers.' ' 176 In
addition, the FLSA is similar in some respects to laws enacted in France
and Britain, and it mirrors the wage boards in Australia and New
Zealand, which legally enforced "minimum standards in pay and
working conditions for all sectors of the economy."' 177 Various
justifications for this form of regulation have surfaced, including
169. See generally MCCLOSKEY, supra note 8, at 198 (discussing the viability of "exit" as an
option for rectifying one's social situation).
170. Juan C. Botero, The Regulation of Labor, 119 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1339, 1339 (2004).
171. Id. at 1342.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
173.

See GEORGE C. LtEF, FREE CHOICE FOR WORKERS: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO WORK

MOVEMENT 7-12 (2005) (arguing that Hoover was an interventionist who set the stage for even
greater government involvement and control during the Roosevelt administration).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
175. See Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules to
Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 727, 759 (2010) (stating
that the FLSA provides a "longstanding statutory remedy" for violations of workers' rights "to
receive what they lawfully earn").
176. Id. at 731 (citing Carol Abdelmesseh & Deanne M. DiBlasi, Why Punitive Damages
Should Be Awarded for Retaliatory Discharge Under the FairLabor StandardsAct, 21 HOFSTRA
LAB. &EMP. L.J. 715, 719 (2004)).

177.

Deakin & Wilkinson, supranote 31, at 151-52.
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contentions that minimum wage laws: (1) are a laudable antipoverty
measure; (2) guarantee progressive wealth redistribution; and (3)
strengthen workplace affiliation.178 Deakin and Wilkinson suggest a
fourth justification: combating the monopsony power of employers in
the low-wage sectors who hold a degree of market control over their
employees. 179
The FLSA regulates the wage rate as part of a broad interpretation
of federal power within the meaning of the Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.180
Meanwhile, states and some municipalities
(depending on state law) took advantage of an expansive interpretation
of the police power' 8' "to set higher wage and hour standards and
enforce those standards themselves.' 8 2 The FLSA represents the
culmination of progressive objectives that undergirded both the
Progressive Era and the New Deal. Building upon a number of federal
and state initiatives,1 3 the FLSA was reinforced by broad statutory
definitions that were designed to accomplish the remedial purpose of the
law. 184
Regardless of whether the FLSA represents society's
capitulation to the inevitability of human progress led by a class of
expert hierarchs or a flight from freedom of contract, arguments favoring
wage controls are often fortified by the contention that "market

178. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
LAW 368 (3d ed. 2008) (considering but largely dismissing these claims).
179. See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 157.
180. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 72-77
(discussing the development of an expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause).
181. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Lest We Forget: Buchanan v. Warley and Constitutional
Jurisprudenceof the "ProgressiveEra," 51 VAND. L. REV. 787, 791 (1998) [hereinafter Epstein,
Lest We Forget] (discussing how the Supreme Court's race relations jurisprudence embraced broad
deference to state action under the states' police power set the stage for Progressives' social
policies).
182. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO COREGULATION 55-56 (2010).
183. See A.B.A. FED. LAB. STANDARDS LEGIS. COMM., THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 311 (Ellen C. Keams et al. eds., 1999) (listing wage and hour law initiatives that commenced in
1840, federal statutes that commenced in 1868, the Seaman's Act of 1915, the Motor Carrier Act
enacted in 1935, the Merchant Marine Act commenced in 1936, the Davis-Bacon Act of 193 1, the
Walsh-Healy Government Contracts Act enacted in 1936, the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933, and various state minimum wage laws).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362-63 (1945) (interpreting the
terms "each," "any," and "employee" broadly to reflect Congress's intent to "include all employees
within the scope of the [FLSA] unless specifically excluded"). Evidently, under FLSA, "employees
are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render
service." Mednick v. Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bartels v.
Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947)).
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185
mechanisms . . . [are] intrinsically flawed and prone to failure."'
Premised on a faith in the now-familiar "race to the bottom"
argument, 186 this claim insists that "[c]ompetition could be destructive"
and must therefore be "channeled and disciplined lest . . . responsible
firms [be] undercut and the public interest injured by opportunistic cost
cutters."187
Whatever the justification for minimum wages may be, their
immediate consequences are not in doubt. An examination of the
immediate outcomes associated with the enactment of the FLSA and
other New Deal labor reforms will enable the reader to ascertain whether
the federal minimum wage and other closely-related programs, such as
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), function consistently with
the goals and objectives of progressive labor ideology. This inspection
will equip readers with important background for accurately assessing
the state of current empirical debates regarding minimum wage
outcomes.

D. The Immediate Consequences of Minimum Wage Law
Prior to the adoption of the FLSA, Congress enacted the NIRA, the
flagship program of the New Deal, in 1933.188 The NIRA facilitated the
creation of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), which enabled
industry and labor "to write the codes under which they would be
regulated."' 189
Congress's failure to amend the law to prohibit
9
0
discrimination' illustrates its ability to disrupt the lives of workers that
social science had labeled "undesirables."' 9' Creating a corporatist
process that benefited large economic entities by destroying their smaller
and less politically-influential competition,9392 the NIRA and its progeny
produced a massive public policy disaster.1
185.

See, e. g., ESTLUND, supra note 182, at 54-55.

186. Id. at 55; see also Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an
IntejurisdictionalRace to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 464-65
(2008) (arguing that the proliferation of at-will employment was the result of under-industrialized
southern and western states seeking to induce capital investment away from industrialized
northeastern states, which in turn adopted at-will employment to maintain their competitive edge in
the labor market).
187. ESTLUND, supra note 182, at 55.
188. See Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 47, at 30.
189. See GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 293.
190. MORENO, supra note 60, at 165.
191. Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 47, at 30.
192. See GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 293-94.
193. Somin, supra note 93, at 650.
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While labor unions thrived, this policy "impose[d] costs on the
overall economy and disproportionately disfavor[ed] members of
marginalized groups."' 194 By taking "advantage of the monopoly powers
granted to them by the NRA and its minimum wage provisions ' " and
conceiving of labor organizations as "white jobs trusts,"'196 labor unions
displaced black workers.' 97 Coherent with the tenets of Public Choice
Theory, exclusion is frequently defended in the name of progress, yet is
98
actually incentivized by the naked self-interest of powerful groups.1
This ongoing process reified social stratification. 199 As part of this
course of action, the NIRA codified wage differentials in such a way that
even when a black employee performed more important tasks than a
white employee, he would frequently have a lower job classification, and
hence a lower wage, than his white counterpart.20 0 Building on this
exclusionary edifice, "racist labor unions in both the South and North
supported establishment of a caste system" in which African Americans
were designated to the unskilled low-paying jobs while whites
performed skilled high-wage jobs. 20 ' The belief behind this system was
that "African Americans were mentally inferior and therefore were
incapable of performing these jobs. 2 0 2 In fact,
"White labor constructed an ideology of white supremacy to secure
and to justify their power and status in their places of work and in the
community."
Many rank-and-file union members adopted this
ideology and came to believe that they
.. were the
203 white workingman's
vanguard against incursions by the darker races.
Inspired by this commanding imperative and consistent with the
fact that the architects of the New Deal knew that labor innovation

194. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 42, at 397.
195. Hutchison, Towarda CriticalRace, supra note 89, at 124.
196. See MORENO, supra note 60, at 4 (quoting Herbert Hill, Lichtenstein's FictionsRevisitedRace and the New Labor History, 7 NEW POLS. 148, 157 (1999)).
197. Hutchison, Toward a CriticalRace, supra note 89, at 124.
198. See Hutchison, Racial Exclusion, supra note 7, at 12.
199. Id. at 11.
200. See BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS, supra note 57, at 86-87.
201. Id. at 90-91.

202. Id. at 91. This is not to absolve employers of their own racism. "Employers, like the rest
of white society, typically believed in African American inferiority, but experience frequently
overcame ideology." Id. Thus, "[e]mployers continued to hire African Americans for occupations
where African American workers had proved themselves competent before the rise of labor unions."

Id.
203. Id. at 90 (quoting HARRY M. McKIVEN JR., IRON AND STEEL: CLASS, RACE, AND
COMMUNITY IN BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA, 1875-1920, at 168 (1925)).
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"would create disproportionate unemployment among . . . African
Americans, ' '204 the minimum wage provisions of the NIRA eliminated
the jobs of half a million blacks in less than a two-year period.2 °5
Building on this particularly pungent record, the enactment of the
FLSA produced results that mirrored a similarly disastrous policy in
Apartheid-era South Africa.20 6 The Labor Department determined that
"between 30,000 and 50,000 workers [mostly southern blacks] lost their
jobs because of the minimum wage within two weeks of the [FLSA's]
imposition., 20 7 This result confirmed the inescapable linkage between
minimum wages and the eugenic virtues of removing from employment
those who are a burden on society.20 8 As leading progressive economist
and future American Economics Association president A.B. Wolfe
predicted, eugenic objectives could be achieved by eliminating
inefficient entrepreneurs through minimum wage regulation, resulting in
the elimination of "ineffective" workers.20 9
In combination with other New Deal programs, minimum wage
regulation contributed to a persistent decline in the African American
employment rate, which is consistent with the deduction that democratic
governments give "the greatest benefits to those who are the best
organized" and the least disenfranchised-categories that include few
blacks.2 10 "Although minimum wage regimes exhibit prima facie
neutrality,' '2 1t it is not difficult to show that labor cartels, sheltered by
progressive labor ideology and minimum wage law, enforced a
philosophy that decisively conceives of blacks and other minorities as
inferior outsiders.21 2 It would therefore require legerdemain of epic
proportions for the instantiation of this ideology to produce actual
economic and social gains for vulnerable populations.
Since evidence of heroic legerdemain cannot be found, it is quite
204.

Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 42, at 398.

205.

David T. Beito, Review of Only One Place of Redress, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 296

(2001). See also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935)
(declaring the NIRA unconstitutional less than two years after it was enacted).
206. Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 42, at 398.
207. David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass": The Decline of Laissez-Faire
Jurisprudenceand the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 130 (1993) (quoting
William A. Keyes, The Minimum Wage and the Davis-Bacon Act: Employment Effects on
Minorities and Youth, 3 J. LAB. RES. 399, 401 (1982)).

208. See Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 186.
209. Id. at 186-87 (citing A.B. Wolfe, Robert L. Hale, & John A. Ryan, Some Phases of the
Minimum Wage: Discussion,7 AM. ECON. REV. 275,278 (1917)).
210. See BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS, supranote 57, at 103.

211.

Hutchison, Waging War on the "Unfit"?, supra note 47, at 33.

212.

See Hutchison, Employee FreeChoice, supra note 42, at 401.
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easy to show that minimum wage regimes fulfilled the aspirations of
early progressive innovators by controlling and disenfranchising the
"undeserving" as part of an evolutionary move that ultimately
reclassified them as "unemployable., 2 13 Hence, progressive architecture
has justly earned a place of honor in America's pantheon of racial
subjugation despite the fact that the progressive establishment generally
refused to defend its commitment to exclusionary labor regimes on
explicitly racial terms.214 Now it is time to discover whether the new
body of minimum wage research and the scholarship of Deakin and
Wilkinson serve to destabilize this remarkable record of subordination
that is unavoidably derived from Progressivism's doctrinal assumptions
and history of minimum wage advocacy in the United States.
II. CLAIMS

AND CONTENTIONS

A. The Wage Regulation Movement
Deakin and Wilkinson's advocacy draws considerable inspiration
from the regulatory urge that characterized government experimentation
during the early to mid-twentieth century in Western countries, including
the United States. 215 In response to progressive currents percolating in
New Zealand, Britain, and the United States, minimum wage regulation
became firmly established in the U.S. and other countries by the 1930s
and featured legislative as well as judicial intervention in the setting of
wages and hours for adult women and young workers.2 16 Deakin and
Wilkinson establish that "[m]inimum wage laws come in a variety of
forms which reflect the wide range of rationales which have been given
for this type of legislation and, to some degree, different national
approaches to labour market regulation. 21 7 Providing useful historical
background by adverting to the "solidaristic and egalitarian" nature of
France's minimum wage,21 8 the authors demonstrate that "the British
minimum wage system for most of the twentieth century was based on
partial and selective statutory regulation and [was] subordinate to the
wider goals of labour law policy" that sought to preserve "a system of

213.

See Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 177, 180.

214. See, e.g., Beito, supra note 205, at 296.
215.
216.

See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 150-52.
See id.

217. Id. at 150.
218. Seeid. at153.
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,

For

instance, the objectives of Britain's wage minimums can be seen in early
laws that were based on the policy of curbing extreme forms of low pay
and were associated with the "sweated trades," meaning that some
employers paid less than a so-called subsistence wage.22 ° In order to
bridge the gap between subsistence and a living wage, the Australian and
New Zealand model aimed at ensuring a "breadwinners" wage to fulltime workers. 221 This perspective accepts the contention that the
payment of subsistence wages, if the practice exists,222 constitutes "an
implicit subsidy from the rest of the community., 223 It also provides a
rationale for wage regulation as an essential device to assure that
workers receive a living wage. 224 Although Deakin and Wilkinson
allege that American efforts in the domain of labor relations were
motivated by the same concerns that fueled foreign labor legislation, 225
this contention appears to gloss over the possibility that labor regulation,
whether within the U.S. or abroad, may have had a more pernicious
rationale.226
B. Deakin and Wilkinson's EmpiricalClaims
Neoclassical economic theory suggests:
[L]abour market[ ] competition between firms for labour and between
workers for jobs ensures that wage rates for labour of comparable
productivity are more or less equal throughout the market and beyond
the power of any individual economic actor to affect. The movement
of the market towards equilibrium acts as an implicit regulator of
individual decisions on whether to trade and at what price. Firms
which attempt to pay below the market rate risk losing their workers to
competitors in the same way that workers who attempt to force up
wages above the competitive level risk losing their jobs as firms at the
219.
220.
221.

Id.at 151.
See id. at 150 (discussing Britain's Trade Boards Act of 1909).
Seeid. at 152.

222. See infra Part HI (contesting this claim).
223. See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 150.
224. See id. at 151-52.
225. Id. at 152.
226. See, e.g., Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 178 (showing how "the intellectual heirs
of progressivism used the prevailing economic crisis" to promote laws and programs that
disemployed African American workers). See also GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 155-56 (describing
the deleterious effects of New Deal policies for blacks, including giving unions the power to lock
blacks out of the labor force).
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227
margin substitute labour for capital or cease to trade.

However appealing this model may be, Deakin and Wilkinson
assert that "repeated empirical studies ... dating back to the first largescale studies of low pay in Britain and the USA have-shown that labour
markets do not display the[ ] characteristics" associated with standard
Evidently intending to leave neoclassical
neoclassical theory.228
economists in high dudgeon and resting their analysis on a lynchpin
supplied by the rhetoric of social justice and progress, the authors argue
that this lacuna in orthodox economic theory provides space for a new
assessment of minimum wage regimes.229
Correspondingly, Deakin and Wilkinson dismiss frequently
repeated arguments that have been used to sustain the neoclassical
consensus, including: (1) the contention that wage regulation itself may
cause inequality by preventing the market from clearing; (2) the
possibility, as Public Choice Theory implies, that minimum wages, like
other labor legislation, are a predictable outcome of organized pressuregroup activity wherein labor unions, operating as labor monopolists,
"seek to cartelise the labour market" and drive wages above the market
rate by depressing demand for employment and diverting resources into
wasteful rent seeking; and (3) the probability that minimum wage laws
have a disproportionately adverse impact on the young, who lack formal
training or qualifications. 230 Despite the inherent strength of these
orthodox claims, the authors remain unconvinced. Apparently satisfied
that low-wage employers suffer from a disabling ecological fragility that
prevents them from paying a "living wage," the authors suggest that
there is scope for bureaucratic paternalism to remedy this situation. 23'
Although Deakin and Wilkinson acknowledge the vast empirical
literature that minimum wage legislation has spawned, they criticize the
consensus view on grounds that it rests "mainly upon time-series studies
using long-term aggregate data of teenage unemployment derived from a
single source: the US Current Population Survey., 23 2 Critics of the
neoclassical viewpoint have suggested that "these studies could not be

227. Deakin & Wilkinson, supranote 31, at 154.
228. Id. (claiming that "[flirms do not automatically adjust wages to changes in demand for
labour and there is considerable divergence in the pay and conditions offered by different employers
to workers doing similar jobs," and dismissing the neoclassical claim that "freely competitive
markets tend towards equilibrium").
229. See id. at 154-55.
230. Seeid. at155.
231. See id. at 158.
232. Id. at 155.
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regarded as definitive since the estimated employment effects are small
and also highly sensitive to the choice of sample period. 233 Instead,
Deakin and Wilkinson rest their judgment on American case studies
authored by Card, Katz, and Krueger,234 which examine variations in
minimum wage increases among the states.235 Premised on such studies,
Card, Katz, and Krueger asserted that minimum wages increase both the
earnings and the employment of vulnerable populations. 236 In harmony
with this contention, the authors point to a British study showing that,
after minimum wage regulation was weakened during the 1980s,
econometric analysis demonstrated a decline in employment in lowpaying service sectors as a result of the decreasing effectiveness of
wages councils in setting higher wages .237 Deakin and Wilkinson argue
that such studies, when taken together, refute the neoclassical
238
understanding of minimum wage increases.
Nevertheless, the authors concede that as of 2008, only two percent
of America's working population receives the minimum wage. 239 They
also admit that two-thirds of the relevant studies indicate that minimum
wages produce negative employment effects.240 Such studies show
"stronger disemployment effects for the least-skilled groups. 24 1 Hence,
the empirical evidence favoring a negative view of minimum wages
remains robust, and "the oft-stated assertion that new minimum wage
' 242
research fails to support the traditional view . . . is clearly incorrect.
Despite such evidence, Deakin and Wilkinson decline to offer any
original empirical evidence to dispute the neoclassical consensus and
insist that a return to the neoclassical view of wage regulation is
unwarranted.243
Emphasizing the empirical observations contained within David
Card and Alan Krueger's Myth and Measurement,244 Deakin and
233. Id.
234. See id. at 155-56.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 155.
237. See id. at 156.
238. See id.
239. Id. at 153.
240. Id. at 156.
241. See id.
242. David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Review of
Evidence from the New Minimum Wage Research 121 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 12663, 2006), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w12663.pdf [hereinafter Neumark
& Wascher, Employment].
243. See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 156.
244. CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 32.
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Wilkinson assert that this book and the prior research on which it was
based 245 were important markers in solidifying new empirical research
and reigniting a new movement that views minimum wage increases as
an essential anti-poverty device. 246 Consistent with this view, poverty
(in the sense of a lack of money and assets) 247 can be explained by other
indices,
such as limited educational opportunity, political
marginalization, unemployment, underemployment, and being a victim
of racism, rather than increasing wage minimums. Taking advantage of
the opportunity for comparative study, which arose from the variations
in rates of increase between state and federal minimums after the
implementation of minimum wage reforms in various U.S. states in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, 248 some economists contend that the studies
show that the earnings and employment of teenagers correlate positively
with increased minimum wages. 249 "Similarly, a study comparing New
Jersey, which increased its minimum wage, with Pennsylvania, which
did not,
found evidence of increasing employment in the former
250
state.
Relying principally on U.S. findings, the authors insist that wage
regulation cannot be seen as "an 'artificial' interference in the free
market., 251 The authors argue that statutory wage minimums are
necessary because "certain groups in the labour market will not have
access to voluntary means of labour organization, such as collective
bargaining., 25 2 Although this statement is remarkable given the
subordinating capacity of labor unions, 253 Deakin and Wilkinson contend
that low pay is an exception to "the neoclassical 'norm' of free
competition" and operates as "a subsidy enabling otherwise
uncompetitive firms and industries to survive.' 254 Based on this
contention and the claim that some studies show that minimum wage
increases produce a positive employment impact, 255 the authors assert
that "[m]inimum wage regulation is therefore necessary in order to help
245. See generally Card, Using Regional Variation in Wages, supra note 32; Card, Do
Minimum Wages Reduce Employment?, supra note 32.

246. See Deakin & Wilkinson, supranote 31, at 155-56.
247.

245, 246
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See Karl E. Klare, Toward New Strategiesfor Low-Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.

n. 4 (1995).
See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 155.
See id.
at 155-56.
Id. at 156.
See id.
at157-58.
Id. at 158.
See supra Part I.
Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 158.
See id. at 157.
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create an environment in which firms compete not on the basis of low
pay but instead
through high labour quality and product and process
256
innovation.
If Deakin and Wilkinson are correct, then the cascade of popular
and scholarly opinion favoring minimum wage increases 257 ought to
reach its inflection point in the following set of observations: (1) that
wage regulation can be implemented without any ill effects; (2) that
minimum wage increases are not only cost-free in terms of negative
employment effects but also constitute a form of societal advancement
wherein productivity, skill levels, and perhaps even Gross Domestic
Product rise; and (3) that not only does wage regulation increase the
level of employment, but the quality of the resulting employment also
rises. 258 While admitting that an overwhelming majority of studies do
not support these observations, Deakin and Wilkinson state that the body
of research disfavoring their claims and the "apparently clear-cut
normative conclusions" arising from such studies "were drawn from
models which ha[ve] only a weak link to real-world conditions. '259
Using the now-familiar irreducible complexity defense, the authors offer
the postmodern observation that the empirical consequences attending
minimum wage increases are highly complex and that empirical work is
insufficient to provide clear, normative guidance to policy makers.
Thus, at the end of the day, complexity implies that "the case for social
policy interventions will continue
to be based on a range of grounds, of
260
which efficiency is only one.,
I1. DECONSTRUCTING THE AUTHORS' CLAIMS
A. Minimum Wages and Subsistence
The authors allege that "it is doubtful whether there is any more
important condition of individual and general well being than the
possibility of obtaining an income sufficient to enable those who earn it

256. Id. at 158.
257. See, e.g., NEUMARK & WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 35, at 249-252
(explaining the popularity of minimum wage regimes).
258. See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 159 ("Minimum wage laws, when introduced
for the first time, would lead to unemployment in firms and industries which previously benefited
from a subsidy, but the workers thereby displaced would find better paying jobs elsewhere and the
capacity of the economy to offer high quality employment would be enhanced").
259. See id. at 166-67.
260. See id. at 167.
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to secure ... the necessaries of life.",26 1 This thesis is both presumptive
and credulous: presumptive because the authors' claim assumes facts not
in evidence,2 62 and credulous because they seem to have been misled by
their own presumptions. The pertinent question becomes whether low
wage beneficiaries of minimum wage regimes are actually poor or,
alternatively put, whether they receive the benefits that minimum wage
advocates allege. To answer such questions, it is important to appreciate
that not every worker within a family needs to earn a sufficiently high
wage in order to secure all of the necessaries of life since family
263
members may cross-subsidize one another for a variety of reasons.
Contrary to Deakin and Wilkinson's supple claims, the legal and
economics literature shows that most of the actual (as opposed to
theoretical) beneficiaries of wage minimums in the United States do not
live in low-income households, nor are they the primary breadwinners
for their families. 264 Thus, it is easy to see why neoclassical economics
"is hostile to minimum wage legislation and to labour standards more
generally, seeing them as an unwarranted interference with the operation
265
of the market and a cause of unemployment" and human misery.
Furthermore, these results may be reinforced by regressive distributional
consequences. While it is important to note that poverty includes more
than economic considerations, which imply that minimum wages or
tax credits cannot alleviate all forms of
earned-income
impoverishment, 266 it is also worth noting that "[n]eoclassical
competitive models of firm behavior predict that wage increases reduce
... that the least valued
the quantity of labor demanded by firms and
267
workers are the first fired or the last hired.,
Since adducible data shows that the primary beneficiaries of wage-

261. Id. at 151.
262. This claim implies but does not prove that in the absence of regulation, low-wage workers
necessarily have difficulty attaining the necessities of life.

263. Reasons for this could include the absence of skills or experience, age, or maturity,
currently possessed by one or more family members. Over time, such family members may acquire
more marketable skills and subsidize other members of the family.
264.

See STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 577 (4th

ed. 2007) (showing that although the minimum wage continues to enjoy wide-spread support, only
17% of low-wage workers in the United States were living in poor households in 2003, and thus, the
people who are generally favored by this type of intervention in the market are not poor). See also
Burkhauser, Couch & Wittenburg, supra note 34, at 31 (showing that "less than 20 cents of every
dollar of the increased wage bill associated with raising the minimum wage from $3.35 to $4.25
actually flowed to poor families").
265. Deakin & Wilkinson, supranote 31, at 150.

266. R. R. Reno, The PreferentialOptionfor the Poor, FIRST THINGS, June-July 2011, at 3,4.
267. Burkhauser, Couch & Wittenburg, supranote 35, at 16.
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rate minima are not necessarily members of poor households, 268 two
observations emerge. First, such data is consistent with the orthodox
economics consensus suggesting that marginalized workers (and not
teenagers or young adults) living in middle-class or upper-middle-class
families are placed within the crosshairs by ongoing attempts to raise
wage minima.
Second, and equally important, if the primary
beneficiaries are members of relatively affluent families, it is doubtful
that Deakin and Wilkinson's objective of providing a living wage to
workers is achievable through statutory wage
regulation,
notwithstanding the existence of some data that shows that living wage
ordinances, in contradistinction to minimum wage increases, may help to
achieve modest reductions in urban poverty, despite their strong negative
effect on employment.2 6 9
B. Revisiting the EmpiricalRecord
Central to Deakin and Wilkinson's thesis is the observation that
modest increases to the minimum wage have no employment effects or,
alternatively, positive ones.27 ° If this is true,
[T]he appropriateness of this method in helping the working poor is
strictly a distributional issue. However, if minimum wage increases
reduce employment and if the jobs lost are concentrated among the
vulnerable groups the policy claims to assist, then policy makers must
consider this unintended consequence. Hence, estimating the elasticity
of employment with respect to minimum wage
increases is more than
2
simply an empirical test of economic theory.
Deakin and Wilkinson's central and correlative claims noticeably
overlook an enormous amount of contrary minimum wage research.272
268. See, e.g., WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 264, at 577.
269. See David Neumark & Scott Adams, Do Living Wage Ordinances Reduce Urban
Poverty? 29-30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7606, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7606.pdf.
270. Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 150.
271. Burkhauser, Couch & Wittenburg, supranote 35, at 16-17.
272. See, e.g., Michael Baker, Dwayne Benjamin & Shuchita Stanger, The Highs and Lows of
the Minimum Wage Effect: A Time-Series Cross-Section Study of the Canadian Law, 17 J. LAB.
ECON. 318 (1999) (studying the effects of Canadian minimum wage legislation on teenagers);
Donald Deere, Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Employment and the 1990-1991 Minimum Wage
Hike, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 232 (1995) (discussing the effects of minimum wage increases on teens
and adult high school dropouts categorized by sex and race); Kenneth A. Couch & David
Wittenberg, The Response of Hours of Work to Increases in the Minimum Wage, 68 S. ECON. J. 171
(2001) (examining the effects of minimum wage increases on teenagers); Neumark & Wascher,
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Leading minimum wage scholars Neumark and Wascher have built upon
more than twenty years of original research to author a book 273 and
numerous other studies that, taken together, dispute many of Deakin and
Wilkinson's claims.
As they summarize the theoretical models of minimum wage
effects on employment, Neumark and Wascher admit that "the
neoclassical model does not predict that an increase in the minimum
wage will reduce employment in every instance. 274 They also concede
that scholars have disagreed about the disemployment effects of wage
minimums ever since Card and Krueger's early claims contesting the
neoclassical consensus view that emerged in the early 1990S.275
However, it is clear that Neumark and Wascher's examination of early
evidence,2 76 of the lagged effects of minimum wages,277 of evidence
associated with employment and school enrollment, 78 of aggregate
effects and trend differences in the state-level panel data approach,2 79 of
data from industrialized countries2 80 (including data from the United
Kingdom substantiating the disemployment effects of wage
21282ndothovrl
from developing countries, and of the overall
regulation),2 8' of studies
evidence point to one conclusion: "[T]he literature-when read broadly
and critically[solidifies] the view that minimum wages reduce
employment of low-skilled workers, and . . . [suggests] that the lowwage labor market can be reasonably approximated by the neoclassical
competitive model. 28 3
Indeed, as Burkhauser and his colleagues show, the elasticity of
demand for labor with respect to increases in the minimum wage is
Employment, supra note 242, at 40-49 (discussing various studies regarding minimum wages).
273.

NEUMARK & WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 35.

274. Id. at 57.
275. See id.
276. See generally id. at 57-63 (outlining the results of minimum wage research studies).
277. See generally id. at 63-65 (evaluating the amount of time it should take "for minimum
wages to have their full effect on employment").
278. See generally id. at 65-66 (describing the use of school enrollment as a variable in
research studies).
279. See generally id. at 67-71 (explaining "the possibility that differences in underlying trends
in employment growth across states" can bias research results).
280. See generally id. at 89-99 (detailing studies of the effects of minimum wage legislation in
seventeen Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, including
Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, and New Zealand).
281. Seeid.at95.
282. See generally id. at 99-103 (describing the complicated factors encountered when
analyzing minimum wage effects in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras,
and Indonesia.
283. Id. at 106.
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greatest for the most vulnerable groups in the working-age population:
young adults with low levels of education, young black adults and teens,
and all teenagers.284 Although,
The new minimum wage literature is dominated by studies that find
that minimum wage increases have an insignificant or, in some cases, a
positive and significant effect on the employment of young adults and
teenagers (aged 16-24) or on other subgroups . . . . Most of these
studies have now generated replies arguing that raising the minimum
285
wage significantly decreases employment in these populations.
Research shows that one could expect a 10% increase in the wage
286
minimum to result in a 5.66% decline in teenage employment.
Furthermore, the estimated elasticity of employment with respect to the
minimum wage for black young adults and teenagers was more than four
times the elasticity for nonblack young adults and teenagers. 287 This
body of research reconfirms the neoclassical consensus, which forecasts
that the most vulnerable are the ones most adversely affected by the
establishment of wage minimums.2 88 Even so, Neumark and Wascher
rightly concede that the effect of wage regulation on employment is only
one factor in evaluating the efficacy of minimum wage regimes as a tool
to improve the economic position of those at the bottom of the income
distribution.2 89
Supplying one of the most comprehensive sets of analyses
available, Neumark and Wascher examine minimum wage effects on the
distribution of wages and earnings:
Given the evidence that minimum wages create spikes in the wage
distribution at the minimum, as well as the evidence of spillover
effects on wages higher up in the distribution, it was only natural for
economists to explore the role of minimum wages in the trend towards
290
greater inequality in U.S. wages ....
In response, their research indicates:
[H]igher minimum wages tend, on average, to reduce the economic
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See Burkhauser, Couch & Wittenburg, supra note 35, at 19.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 23.
Id.
See id. at 16.

289.

See NEUMARK & WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 35, at 106.

290.

Id. at 125.
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well-being of affected workers.

Evidence regarding the effects on

workers initially paid at or just above the minimum suggests that their
labor income declines as a result of minimum wage increases,
reflecting negative effects of minimum wages on employment and
hours. For workers earning above the minimum, such effects do not
accord well with the simple neoclassical model, in which a higher
minimum wage increases demand for more-skilled workers. Instead,
[the effects] may reflect a desire among employers to maintain wage
puts
differentials between workers, so that a higher minimum wage
291
upward pressure on other wages, amounting to cost increases.
Turning next to complex issues regarding the effects of minimum
wages on the distribution of income, Neumark and Wascher confirm that
many minimum wage workers are not members of poor families, making
it more difficult for lower-income families to feel the beneficial
distributional effects of minimum wages.292 Although it is possible that
wage minimums could reduce employment (a view supported by the
evidence), it is equally possible that minimum wages could have overall
benefits on poor families.293 Despite these contrasting possibilities, "the
effects or
research tends to find either no evidence of distributional
294
evidence that minimum wages increase poverty.
Enhanced by reference to their own original research, which has
withstood academic scrutiny, Neumark and Wascher's wide-ranging
analysis of minimum wage research supports two important conclusions.
First, higher minimums "impose costs on low-skilled workers and low' 2 95
income families without delivering benefits that offset these costs.
Second, and in direct contrast to Deakin and Wilkinson's line of
reasoning, the results "indicate that reductions in minimum wages would
yield net benefits. 2 96 On a more hypothetical level, Neumark and
Wascher "are skeptical that eliminating the minimum wage would, as
non-economists sometimes argue, lead to a widespread decline in wages
to subsistence levels. 2 97 These observations dispute Deakin and
Wilkinson's fundamental claim that minimum wage regimes are justified

291. Id. at 139.
292. See id. at 148 (noting that the evidence shows that minimum wages tend to lower earnings
of low-wage workers rather than raising them, but concluding that none of the factors raised in this
subsection of their book are decisive).
293. See id. at 189.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 290.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 291.
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by the goal of eliminating subsistence. 298 Additionally, Neumark and
Wascher "wonder whether eliminating the minimum wage might
improve conditions of our nation's most blighted and depressed urban
areas, where one can hardly argue that polices adopted so far have been
successful. ' 299 If Neumark and Wascher are correct, then Deakin and
Wilkinson's thesis that minimum wages necessarily help the poor is
dubious.
Finally, since Deakin and Wilkinson rely so heavily on the work of
Card and Krueger ("CK"), 300 a few words about the deficiencies of this
research is useful. Scholars backed by rich original and comparative
research have questioned the validity of CK's claims for a number of
reasons.30 1 Although it has been argued that CK's study, which relies on
telephone survey data, is the result of the "most sophisticated techniques
available to economists, 30 2 there is little reason to believe "that [CK's]
methodology is superior to more conventional forms of economic
analysis. 30 3 Scholars who inspected state employment by reviewing
actual payroll records, as opposed to CK's preferred survey approach,
found that an increase in wage minimums inevitably led to a decrease in
employment.30 4 Although proof of cause and effect may be difficult
since Deakin and Wilkinson rely heavily on CK's largely-refuted
analysis, it can be safely assumed that the authors have failed to validate
their claims. However, if Deakin and Wilkinson's contention that
economic analysis fails to provide clear normative guidance to policy
makers30 5 were to be momentarily accepted, it would become important
to reexamine the aspirations, assumptions, goals, and objectives of
minimum wage proponents from a historical perspective that is fully
cognizant of the immediate consequences of implementing progressive

298. See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 158.
299. NEUMARK & WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 35, at 291.
300. See, e.g., David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case
Study of the Fast-FoodIndustry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania,84 AM. ECON. REV. 772 (looking

at evidence gleaned from the fast-food industry and focusing largely on the evidence from New
Jersey and Pennsylvania).
301.

See, e.g., Finis Welch, Comment, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 842, 842-43 (1995)

(demonstrating that one of the major weaknesses of the Card-Krueger approach is a deficient data
collection methodology).
302.

Richard B. Berman, Dog Bites Man: Minimum Wage Hikes Still Hurt, WALL ST. J., Mar.

29, 1995, at A12.
303. Hutchison, Toward a CriticalRace, supra note 89, at 115.
304. Id. (citing David Neumark & William Wascher, The Effect of New Jersey's Minimum
Wage Increase on Fast-FoodEmployment: A Re-Evaluation Using Payroll Records (1996) (on file

with author).
305. Deakin & Wilkinson, supranote 31, at 167.
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labor ideology. This is the subject to which I now turn.
C. Assumptions, Corollaries,and Dangers to Society
We are often the captives of our pictures of the world, and in the end,
if the world does not look just like them, their influence on our
perceptions is nevertheless profound ....Pictures lead not only to
predictions but also to principles.
Our vision of what is guides our
3 6
approach to what ought to be. 0
Given Sowell's admonition that danger to society arises from the
prevailing social vision of America's current era, it is noteworthy that
much social commentary and a plethora of public opinion polls confirm
the extraordinary popularity of minimum wages.3 °7 Responding to a
social vision that is ably assisted by the dogmatic assumption that such
programs necessarily aid the poor and act to diminish economic
inequality, 30 8 the public largely accepts wage regulation as a defensible
element of progressive labor ideology. Nonetheless, as we have seen,
the literature plainly shows this perception to be outdated because "it is
no longer the case that the beneficiaries of a minimum wage increase are
disproportionately from poor households., 30 9 Wage minimums, more
likely than not, benefit higher-income families.3 10
Stubbornly committed to the hypothesis that wage minimums
benefit low-wage workers, Deakin and Wilkinson postulate that
neoclassical hostility to wage minimums fails to adequately account for
market failure in the low-wage sector, which constitutes a subsidy that
facilitates the survival of otherwise uncompetitive firms and
industries.311 In other words, this foundational claim is sustained by the
assertion that neoclassical economics is fundamentally flawed. This
lachrymose syllogism permits scholars to justify paternalistic
intervention within markets in order to restrain the choices of parties to
exchange human capital for certain levels of wages, and this process
may constrain human freedom in exchange for authoritarianism led by
elite hierarchs. While the market failure thesis has gained traction
within the marketplace of ideas, it is not persuasive. First, prescinding
306.
IMPROVE
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
PUBLIC LAW 1 (1997).
See NEUMARK & WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES, supranote 35, at 249.
See id. at 249-50.
See id. at 252.
See WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 264, at 577.
See Deakin & Wilkinson, supranote 31, at 158.
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from the core claim embedded in the authors' market failure allegation,
alert readers will ponder the implications of the authors' foundational
"survival of the fittest" argument, which celebrates the demise of
uncompetitive firms. This is due to little difference between the authors'
survival of the fittest preference and early progressive claims that
celebrate the social benefits resulting from eliminating uncompetitive
people who work in uncompetitive firms and industries and, hence, are a
drag on the nation's economic and moral health.3 12 Although there is
more to say about the propensity of leading progressives to tie the
nation's health to the elimination of uncompetitive people, Deakin and
Wilkinson's repeated market failure assertion pushes dangerously forth
with little evident concern for vulnerable workers who are likely to be
terminated from their jobs when society raises the minimum wage rate.
It bears repeating that the literature shows a disproportionate
number of individuals disemployed by wage minimums to be, in fact,
African American teenagers and young adults.1 3 Additionally, data
concerning the longer-run effects of wage minimums involving skills
acquisition and schooling, which affect future labor market outcomes,
shows that wage minimums have a much more adverse effect on
blacks.3 14
Deakin and Wilkinson's objective of eliminating
uncompetitive firms, in combination with their admission that two-thirds
of the relevant studies support the hypothesis that minimum wages have
a negative employment impact, 31 5 suggest two possible conclusions: (1)
either they have surrendered to willful blindness toward the plight of
low-wage workers; or (2) they have embraced the teachings of early
progressives who agreed that "minimum-wage-induced job loss was a
social benefit because it performed3 16the eugenic service of ridding the
labor force of the 'unemployable."
Although the "[p]rogressive position in contemporary times has
been reconfigured to reflect a stronger commitment to personal
' 3 17
autonomy and freedom in arenas such as abortion and civil rights,
and while charity commends that readers absolve the authors of bad
intentions, lurking in the shadows of Deakin and Wilkinson's analysis is
evidence that indicates striking parallels between their claims and the
stated objectives of early progressives in the United States or labor union
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See, e.g., Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 186.
See, e.g., NEUMARK AND WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 35, at 221.
Seeid.
Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 156.
See Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 186.
Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, supra note 47, at 454.
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exclusionists in pre-Mandela South Africa. Recall Seager's audacious
admonition that in order to maintain a capable and efficient race of
people, society must "courageously cut off lines of heredity that have
been proved to be undesirable by isolation or sterilization,"'3 18 or
Commons' contention that allowing inferior races to work engenders an
economic competition that pays no deference to superior races and
lowers overall wages, leading the race with the lowest level of
necessities to displace the others.319 Commons' and Seager's statements
signify that an efficient way to make the nation safe for "deserving"
workers
is to reduce the employment opportunities of
"unemployables.,, 320
Evenhanded observers can be pardoned for
concluding that such assertions are on all fours with ongoing minimum
wage advocacy. Alternatively, consider the claims made by white
supremacist workers in pre-Mandela South Africa who "saw the
payment of low wages to blacks as exploitation of the whites. 32 '
Indeed, in South Africa and elsewhere, there was and is a widespread
belief that raising the minimum wage would make "legalized racial
discrimination unnecessary since it would mandate wages exceeding
3 22
black productivity" and thereby reduce the incentive to hire blacks.
Striving to achieve a world where social justice presumptions
overrule the empirical evidence, Deakin and Wilkinson's minimum
wage advocacy reflects the insistent influence of exclusionary values.
This influence can be seen most poignantly in their explicit dependence
on the rhetoric of Fabians such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who
sought to promote the efficient use of labor and stabilize its supply with
323
a series of institutional reforms, including minimum wages.
Inexplicably, the authors ignore the Webbs' incandescent embrace of
state-sponsored unemployment as both the solution to the problems
posed by "unemployables" and a sign of the nation's health.324
Apparently validating John Stuart Mill's commitment to Social
Darwinism, which excludes an "inferior class of labourers" from the
workforce, 325 Deakin and Wilkinson also manage to ignore the Fabians'
318. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 186 (quoting Seager, supra note 163, at 10)).
319. See id. at 181 (citing COMMONS, supra note 132, at 151)).
320. See id.
at181, 186.
321.

See WALTER E. WILLIAMS, SOUTH AFRICA'S WAR AGAINST CAPITALISM 64 (1989).

322. Id.at 63.
323. See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 165.
324. See Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 186 (citing WEBB & WEBB, supra note 130, at
785)).
325.

W.H. HuTT, THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:

1930-1975, at 10 (1980)

(quoting John Stuart Mil)).
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repugnant observation that employers who paid less and workers who
received less than the hierarchically-determined "living wage" were
parasites. 3326b Whether the parallels between Deakin and Wilkinson's
contentions completely mirror those of avowed opponents of
marginalized workers or are purely coincidental is a question that
requires future exploration. For our present purposes, what is beyond
dispute and subsists beyond the question of whether progressive policy
preferences are infected with racist intent is the fact that the racist effects
of progressive policies survive.
Additionally, we should note the conspicuous weakness at the core
of Deakin and Wilkinson's market failure argument. Frequently posited
as ontology of necessity and embraced as a compelling faith, market
failure claims ignore the probability of government failure or,
alternatively (due to the rich possibilities associated with majoritarian
capture),327 the probability that government intervention disfavors the
individuals and groups that lack economic and political clout. 328 Since it
was only natural that progressive programs were justified to the wider
world by focusing on intended and "deserving" beneficiaries of such
programs without fairly considering the adverse effects that such
policies had on those harmed,32 9 and since the victims lacked sufficient
political and economic influence to protect themselves from the inherent
authoritarianism of democratic government,33 ° the specter of intentional
domination and control has always been a threat to the viability of
African Americans and others. Nor has this threat ended. For example,
consider the motivation behind labor union support for the Davis-Bacon
Act or state-based versions of this law.33 1 Such laws honor the legacy of
Robert Bacon who wished to protect "white union men" from losing
their jobs to "defectives. 332 Unsurprisingly, such statutes operating as
super-minimum-wage laws, protect, and are intended to protect, white
workers from competing with low-skilled and lower-wage African
326.

See Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 180.

327.

See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 4 (1993)

("Modem democratic states have themselves become weapons in the war of all against all, as rival
interest groups compete with each other to capture government and use it to seize and redistribute
resources among themselves").
328. See Hutchison, Racial Exclusion, supranote 7, at 13.
329.

EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supranote 11, at 72.

330. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Inherent Authoritarianismin Democratic Regimes, in
OUT OF AND INTO AUTHORITARIAN LAW 125, 125 (Andras Sajo ed. 2002) (stating that
"[a]uthoritarianism is an inherent structural tendency of democratic regimes").
331. See Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supranote 42, at 412.
332. See id. ("Bacon denied anti-African American animus, but made clear his discomfort with
'defective' workers taking jobs that 'belonged' to White union men").
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Americans 333 either at the federal or state level. 334 This illustration
demonstrates that "[m]ajoritarian seizure gains traction by invoking
social justice rhetoric" (protecting the deserving from unfair competition
from "defectives" or other "unemployables"), "but allows powerful
interest groups to exclude their weaker competitors from the labor
markets they wish to dominate., 335 This observation provides readers
with a partial explanation for the durability and justificatory power of
the market failure thesis.
A fuller explanation emerges upon reconsidering the empirics of
minimum wages, including the adverse employment and distributional
effects (i.e., income effects) for vulnerable individuals and groups,
coupled with a recapitulation of the immediate and continuing
consequences of New Deal labor law. Although markets fail, this
composite explanation fractures the legitimating force of the market
failure thesis. Promising more than it could ever deliver, this thesis,
when merged with the fact that minimum wage beneficiaries are unlikely
to consist of low-wage minority workers, is strongly suggestive of two
alternative explanations for the existence of wage regulation:
government failure on one hand, or a deliberate effort to improve society
by ridding the nation of "unemployables" on the other.3 36 Within the
limits established by bounded rationality, either explanation seems
dreadfully promising in view of the fact that "the ghosts of 'the
337
Progressive Era continue to subjugate African Americans today.
Goldberg cogently explains:
The architects of the New Deal, the Fair Deal, and the Great Society all
inherited and built upon the progressive welfare state. And they did
this in explicit terms, citing such prominent race builders as Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as their inspirations. Obviously, the
deliberate racist intent in many of these policies was not shared by
subsequent generations of liberals. But that didn't erase the racial
content of the policies themselves. The Davis-Bacon Act still hurts
low-wage blacks, for example. FDR's labor and agricultural policies

333. See John Stossel, Government Against Blacks, TOWNHALL.COM (June 1, 2011),
http://townhall.com/columnists/johnstossel/2011/06/01/government against blacks.
334. See, e.g., Hutchison, Employee Free Choice, supra note 42, at 412 (describing the
exclusionary effects of Pennsylvania's prevailing wage law on African American workers).
335. Hutchison, Choice, ProgressiveValues, supra note 47, at 438.
336. See Bernstein & Leonard, supranote 38, at 186-187.
337. Hutchison, Racial Exclusion, supra note 7, at 13 (citing GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at
268-69)).
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threw millions of blacks out of work and off their land. 338
Since the racially-tinged effects of New Deal labor law persist, such
as the yawning unemployment gap between white and black
Americans, 339 and since vulnerable workers are still disproportionately
and predictably harmed by minimum wage regimes 340 such as the FLSA,
the Davis-Bacon Act, and state wage minimums, sophisticated
hermeneutics are not necessary to show that dependence upon the
market failure thesis that justifies such regulation remains a clear and
present danger to the future of low-wage workers. This is true even if
one assumes that the results of progressive labor ideology were not
deliberate.
Informed by empirical evidence, conscious of the progressive
suppositions, and responding to the likelihood of regulatory failure made
real by apparatchiks brimming with overconfidence in both themselves
and the benevolence of the state, minimum wage skeptics can be
forgiven for perceiving persistent political and scholarly support of wage
reform initiatives as part of a policy preference that would rid society of
the "unfit" and the "unemployables. 34 1 This possibility implies that
42
minimum wage regimes, however justified, are an abuse of power1
responding favorably to the demand by progressives to exclude various
141
groups in the name of progress.
History verifies that various strands of American progressive
thought, nimbly supported by progressive ideas from abroad, symbolize
the ossification of the belief that the government has a responsibility to
protect deserving workers. 344 Recall that in its origins, this morallyproblematic platform required the social control of undeserving workers
so much so that early "labor-legislation advocates defended the
exclusion of unfit workers not as an ostensibly necessary evil, but as a
positive social benefit. 34 5 Enlisting either an expansive conception of
state police power or a broad interpretation of federal authority premised
on the Commerce Clause,346 this contagious move "marked not only the
338. GOLDBERG, supra note 72, at 268-69.
339. Hutchison, Racial Exclusion, supranote 7, at 13.
340. See Burkhauser, Couch & Wittenburg, supra note 35, at 17.
341. For a discussion of such issues, see Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38.
342. See generally Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race, supra note 89 (analyzing minimum
wage regimes to determine if they are masking abuses of power).
343. See Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 177.
344. See id. at 186.
345. See id. at 177.
346. See, e.g., Epstein, Lest We Forget,supra note 181, at 791 (stating that Plessy v. Ferguson
"marked an unwarranted aggrandizement of the state police power").
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advent of the welfare state but also an extraordinary vogue for race
thinking and for eugenics. 347 While today's policy makers refuse to
defend exclusionary wage legislation or other forms of "social justice"
legislation on grounds of racial superiority, they are prepared to look to
the Progressive Era and the New Deal as sources of inspiration for
renewed legal innovation as part of their insistence that centralized
government power is the correct solution to human problems.348
Favoring a sharp expansion in regulation premised on the viewpoint
that "social progress equate[s] active government with good
government," 349 government intervention is offered under a broad
banner of equality that appears to require the destruction of liberty of the
most vulnerable among us. 350 This evisceration of human liberty is
accomplished through a policy of reclassifying low-wage workers as
uncompetitive and thereby unworthy of work. This process, which
actually worsens the condition of purported beneficiaries rather than
delivering benefits to them, is filled with contradictions. The pertinent
question becomes whether such a process benefits the public interest,
national efficiency, and the interest of marginalized Americans,
particularly African Americans. In the context of minimum wage law,
this article responds to this question in the negative. Whether one relies
exclusively on the empirical record (which undermines the normative
and efficiency case), or, alternatively, refracts Deakin and Wilkinson's
argument through a prism supplied by an analysis of the history,
foundational assumptions, and consequences of the progressive
movement (which undermines the moral case), it appears that the
authors' wage regulation advocacy is Panglossian.
IV. CONCLUSION

Throughout the world, the great ideological crusades fought by
twentieth-century intellectuals spanned a diverse array of fields: the
eugenics movement, progressive labor initiatives, the welfare state,
socialism, and communism.3 5' Such highly disputed crusades are alike
in their moral exaltation of the progressive ideology that is anointed

347. Bernstein & Leonard, supra note 38, at 177.
348. See Hutchison, Choice Progressive Values, supra note 47, at 454.
349.

See EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 7.

350. See Roger Scruton, Liberty and Equality: American Liberalism Sacrifices the Formerto
Impose the Latter, Not to Mention What It's Done to Morality, Am.SPECTATOR, June 2008, at 38,
38.
351. See SOWELL, VISION OF THE ANOINTED, supra note 37, at 5.
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above public interest.3 52 Hence, the very different views of rank-and-file
citizens, including members of vulnerable populations, are superseded
by progressive presumptions that are imposed through government
power.353 Endeavoring to save the masses from themselves and society
from itself, hierarchs favor solutions that rarely work.3 54 Correlatively,
society's most vulnerable populations remain prey to subjugating
policies.
Relying on more than pure empirical evidence and conventional
policy prescriptions, this reply essay explains why Deakin and
Wilkinson's analysis is, in several respects, inadequate. Although the
authors' analytic inadequacy arises from many sources, three sources
deserve special attention. First, Deakin and Wilkinson fail to impartially
consider the entire body of empirical evidence. Since wage minimums
have largely achieved their subordinating potential, it is noticeable that
the authors neglect to clarify the unintended consequences of minimum
wages or, alternatively and more ominously, the nefarious intent of
many minimum wage proponents. For instance, Deakin and Wilkinson
ignore the fact that "labor unions have an incentive to support the
minimum wage because it shifts labor demand toward higher-skilled
unionized workers., 355 While neither labor advocates (i.e., present-day
progressives) nor contemporary labor unions boast about labor unions'
racially exclusionary past or offer a prescription for attaining a racially
discriminatory future, subordinating motives remain deducible. Battered
by the vagaries of modem history, including declining private sector
union density rates that threaten unions' political and economic
influence, and burdened by the irreparable disintegration of worker
solidarity, labor unions and their ideological allies have succumbed, as
Public Choice Theory predicted, to the incentive to pursue hegemony
through politics and pro-labor legislation.356 That is why recent efforts
to raise the minimum wage have drawn strong labor union support. 357 If
352.

Id.

353.

See id.

354. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 93, at 650 (describing the decrease in America's GNP as a
result of the NIRA).
355.

See NEUMARK & WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 35, at 253. See also MORGAN

0. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICAN POORER: THE COST OF LABOR LAW 29 (1987) ("To the extent
that unions are successful, they redistribute income toward their members, who are predominantly
white, male, and well paid, at the expense of consumers as a whole, taxpayers, nonunion workers,
the poor, and the unemployed-groups with lower average incomes than union members");
ESTLUND, supra note 182, at 55 (showing that the FLSA was largely supportive of collective

bargaining, which was seen as the primary vehicle for improving wages and working conditions).
356.
357.

See Hutchison, Reclaiming the FirstAmendment, supra note 16, at 705.
See, e.g., Steven Malanga, Let Them Eat Minimum Wage: How a Group of Gotham

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss1/3

46

Hutchison: Waging War on "Unemployables"? Race, Low-Wage Work, and Minimum W

WAGING WAR ON "UNEMPLOYABLES"

2011]

minimum wage regimes inflict pain, it is foreseeable that the adverse
effects of such regimes are largely borne by the most vulnerable among
us, giving rise to the distinct probability that racially tinged effects will
result, irrespective of the stated motive. Although minimum wages are
defended as positive vehicles that diminish marginalization, the
neoclassical evidence still shows that wage regulation contributes to
human misery, and the empirical record provided by Deakin and
Wilkinson fails to destabilize this traditional view.
Second, and in relation to the first observation, the authors plainly
fail to substantiate their concluding claim that there is probably a good
efficiency-based case for minimum wage legislation.35 8 This is because
the empirical record neither supports the contention that wage
minimums have either no impact or a positive impact on the
employment of low-wage workers, nor does it substantiate the authors'
contention that market efficiency is improved by the removal of socalled uncompetitive firms and workers from the economy. Wage
minimums, rather than improving national efficiency and the well being
of low-wage workers, expand inequality and social exclusion by further
constraining
the income, employment, and liberty of vulnerable
9
groups.

35

Third, the authors' analytical shortcomings betray their palpable
sympathy for progressive values and assumptions. As we have seen on
countless occasions, social justice dogma, forged in the crucible of
exclusionary presumptions and propelled by the logic of Social
Darwinism, leads inevitably to disproportionately adverse racial effects.
Since such results are foreseeable, it is highly likely that the progressive
labor ideology sustaining Deakin and Wilkinson's analysis constitutes a
self-preoccupied falsifying veil that conceals reality and places the lives
and dignity of disadvantaged Americans at risk. Properly appreciated,
the authors' advocacy snubs the strong normative case against wage
regulation and implies that wage minimums can be seen as part of a
hopeful ideological crusade that wages war on "unemployables."
Business Leaders Plans to Help the Poor, THE CITY J. (July 16, 2004), http://www.cityjoumal.org/printable.php?id=1663 (explaining that a raise in the minimum wage will strengthen
unions and result in a loss of jobs for low-wage workers who are not unionized). See also James
Sherk, Union Members, Not Minimum-Wage Earners,Benefit When the Minimum Wage Rises, TuE
HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2007), www.heritage.org/research/economy/wm1350.cfn (explaining
how "organized labor led the fights to raise the minimum wage in six states and to give Democrats
control of Congress, in part on a platform for raising the [federal] minimum wage").
358. See Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 167.
359. See NEUMARK & WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES, supra note 35, at 141-48 (describing the
effects of minimum wage increases on employment).
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